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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD: DO DIFFERENT 
UNDERSTANDINGS HELD BY THE PEOPLE SHAPE POLITICAL SYSTEMS? 
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PhD Dissertation 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
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Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. Ordinary people do not understand the 
same thing from democracy. Nevertheless, intellectuals and the political elite alike 
promote democracy as an ideal to be emulated. In addition, democracy literature does 
not extensively study the factors, which affect the ways in which ordinary people 
understand the term. A major goal of this research is to investigate how the context 
people occupy affects the ways in which they understand democracy. To do this, I use 
World Values Survey 6th wave, which was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and 
covers 60 countries. Analysis demonstrates that GDP per capita (PPP) is an 
important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in 
richer countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to 
democracy while people in poorer countries tend to consider economic characteristics 
as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the possibility of the presence of 
specific support to the regime in poorer countries and the presence of diffuse support 
to the regime in richer countries, making consolidation of democracy harder in poorer 
countries. Analysis also shows that in poorer countries authoritarian tendencies are 
higher among the people than among the people in richer countries. Analysis does not 
provide any evidence that the ways in which people define democracy shape the 
political regime. Comparative study of Egypt and Tunisia shows that two factors 
affect the outcome of transitions: elite coherence and electoral system preference.  
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ÖZET 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD: DO DIFFERENT 
UNDERSTANDINGS HELD BY THE PEOPLE SHAPE POLITICAL SYSTEMS? 
 
 
 
OSMAN ŞAHİN 
 
Doktora Tezi 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, halkın demokrasi tanımları, prosedürel demokrasi, 
substantif demokrasi, yaygın destek, özel amaçlı destek, Mısır, Tunus 
 
Demokrasi, anlamı üzerinde konsensüsün olduğu bir terim değildir. Aksine literatürde 
bir çok demokrasi tanımı yer almaktadır. Buna rağmen entelektüel ve siyasi elit, 
demokrasiyi dünyada herkes tarafından kabul görmesi gereken bir ideal olarak 
tanımlamaya devam etmektedir. Ancak özellikle de sıradan insanların demokrasi 
denildiği zaman aynı şeyi anlamadıkları çok açıktır. Dahası sosyal bilimler literatürü, 
sıradan insanların demokrasi teriminden ne anladıklarını ve bu insanların kendi 
demokrasi tanımlarını yaparken hangi faktörlerden etkilendiğini kapsamlı bir şekilde 
çalışmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amaçlarından birisi çevresel faktörlerin (context) 
insanların demokrasi tanımlarını nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktır. Bu kapsamda 2010-
2014 arasında altıncı dalgası 60 farklı ülkede yapılan Dünya Değerler Anketinden  
(World Values Survey) faydalanılmıştır. Analizler, Satın Alma Paritesine göre Kişi 
Başı Gelirin, değişik ülkelerdeki insanların demokrasi tanımları üzerinde etkisi 
olduğu göstermektedir. Bu değerin yüksek olduğu ülkelerde bireyler demokrasiyi 
prosedürel özellikler üzerinden tanımlarken bu değerin düşük olduğu ülkelerde 
insanların demokrasiyi ekonomik karakterler üzerinden tanımlamışlardır. Bu durum, 
ekonomik açıdan gelişmiş ülkelerdeki insanların demokratik rejime desteklerinin 
yaygın destek (diffuse support) şeklindeyken ekonomik açıdan gelişmemiş ülkelerde 
demokrasiye desteğin özel amaçlı destek (specific support) şeklinde olduğu ihtimaline 
işaret etmektedir. Analizler, bireyler arasındaki otoriter eğilimlerin ekonomik açıdan 
gelişmemiş ülkelerde daha yaygın olduğunu da göstermiştir. Bulgular birlikte 
değerlendirildiğinde ise ekonomik açıdan az gelişmiş ülkelerde, demokratik 
konsolidasyonda önemli problemler yaşanmasının daha olası olduğu sonucuna 
varılması mümkündür. Ancak araştırma, otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçişte 
insanların demokrasiyi nasıl tanımladıklarının herhangi bir etkisi olduğuna dair bir 
bulguya varmamıştır. Mısır ve Tunus karşılaştırmalı çalışması siyasi elit arasındaki 
bağlılığın ve seçim sistemi seçiminin otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçişte önemli 
etmenler olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.   
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Democracy does not have a uniform meaning. It is an abstract, ambiguous, and 
highly idealistic label (Mishler and Rose, 2001). While the meaning of the term entails 
ambiguity, intellectuals and the political elite promote democracy as an ideal to be 
emulated by the rest of the world. However, ordinary people hardly understand the 
same thing from democracy. Besides, the literature on democracy does not say much 
about the factors that affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. 
This is an important weakness of the literature given that some research suggests 
political culture and people’s attitudes in a given society is one of the important 
determinants of the regime type and quality of its institutions (Eckstein, 1966; Almond 
and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). One of the primary goals of this research is then to 
investigate how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they understand 
democracy and act upon it. 
 Therefore, one important motivation of this research is to understand the factors 
that influence the ways in which people understand and define democracy. A second 
motivation is to understand if individual attributes of the people interact with the 
context people inhabit. Third, this research aims to understand whether people’s 
understanding of democracy has been one of the factors that determined the trajectory 
of political regimes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. 
In parallel with these goals, this research is organized as follows: Chapter 2 
reviews the literature on different conceptualizations of democracy and 
democratization. This chapter also establishes the conditions under which the political 
elite might be more receptive to political change in authoritarian regimes. Chapter 3 
analyzes data from 60 countries. In this research, I use World Values Survey 6th wave 
(2010-2014) to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4 investigates the ways in which individual 
attributes of the people (age, income level, education, and religiosity) interact with the 
context that people inhabit. This chapter scrutinize if the individual attributes affect 
people’s understanding of democracy in the same way in countries with varying levels 
of GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP hereafter). Chapter 5 studies Egypt 
and Tunisia and the political trajectory these countries followed after 2011. These two 
countries correspond to two diverse routes in the Middle East with regards to 
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democratization. Tunisia emerged as the only successful case to establish minimum 
requirements for a democracy after the Arab Uprisings that started in late 2010 (Stepan 
and Linz, 2013; Volpi and Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Egypt is a case where a 
revolution by the people is aborted by the Egyptian military (Volpi and Stein, 2015; 
Szmolka, 2015). Mubarak is ousted in Egypt but only to be replaced by another strong 
man in uniform. I argue that a comparative study of these two cases has the potential to 
reveal the dynamics that fostered a democratic accord in Tunisia and caused a 
reinstatement of authoritarianism in Egypt.  Chapter 6 makes final conjectures and 
conclusions. 
 My analyses demonstrate that GDP per capita (PPP) is an important factor 
affecting the ways in which people define democracy. People in economically more 
developed countries are more likely to consider procedural characteristics as essential to 
democracy while people in economically less developed countries tend to consider 
economic characteristics as essential to democracy. This finding indicates the 
possibility of the presence of specific support to the regime in economically less 
developed countries and the presence of diffuse support to the regime in economically 
more developed countries, thus making consolidation of democracy much harder in 
economically less developed countries. Analyses also show that in economically less 
developed countries authoritarian tendencies are higher among the people than it is in 
economically more developed countries. In addition, analysis reveals that education and 
income, which according to Lipset (1959; 2003) two key variables for a democratic 
regime, do not have the same effect in every context. GDP per capita (PPP) is an 
important contextual factor shaping the ways in which these two variables affect 
people’s definitions of democracy. However, my analyses do not present any evidence 
about the possibility that the ways in which people define democracy also shape the 
political regime. The comparative study of Egypt and Tunisia in chapter 5 shows that 
two other factors affect the outcome of transitions or the possibility of an incumbent 
takeover of democracy: elite coherence and electoral system preference. 
 2 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1. Conceptualizations of democracy 
 
Gallie (1956) argues that democracy is an essentially contested term. Its uses 
and meanings include endless disputes, which make it almost impossible to find a 
clearly definable general use that would be identified as correct or standard in the field 
(Collier and Letivsky, 1997). Collier et al. (2006) suggest that democracy is an 
internally complex concept. Therefore, different users may view or define it in different 
ways (p. 216). According to Collier and Levitsky (1997), different perceptions of 
democracy yielded a proliferation of democracy with adjectives in the field. As a result, 
democracy studies suffer from the presence of hundreds of different definitions of 
democracy. 
Doherty and Mecellem (2012) argue that scholars usually point to structural 
aspects of a political system when defining democracy. These scholars recognized 
essential elements of democracy to be some combination of procedural structures such 
as free, fair and periodic elections, access to alternative sources of information, freedom 
of expression.  
Schumpeter is one of the first researchers to make a procedural definition of 
democracy in the aftermath of the terrible 1930s, as early as 1942. He defines 
democracy to be “…the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
where the executive acquires the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote” (2008, p. 269). In a similar fashion, Huntington (1991) defines a 
regime democratic “… to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers 
are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates clearly 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.” 
Linz and Stepan (1978, p.5) also advocate a definition of democracy that puts its major 
emphasis on elections. They define democracy as the “…freedom to create political 
parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding 
any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability”. 
Schumpeterian definitions of democracy are criticized for focusing too much on 
elections while simply ignoring other dimensions of democracy. It is true that any 
viable definition of democracy should entail elections and the principle of broad-based 
popular participation. The source of disagreements remains on what other aspects to 
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include (Knutsen and Wegmann, 2016). Diamond (1999) also thinks that free and fair 
elections are central to any democratic regime, nevertheless it is far from a sufficient 
condition and those studies that focus on elections seem to reduce the significance of 
civil liberties to irrelevance thus committing what Terry Lynn Karl (2000) calls a 
“fallacy of electoralism”. 
Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy, though still built on procedures, avoids 
the fallacy of electoralism. He argues that democracy is a system requiring the existence 
of a type of government, which has a continuing responsiveness to the preferences of its 
citizens who are considered as political equals. Dahl lists eight conditions that are 
critical for the establishment of two dimensions that he deems necessary for 
democracy’s existence: inclusiveness (participation and representation) and public 
contestation (opposition). According to Dahl, those requirements for a democracy 
among large number of people to exist are as follows: 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
6. Alternative sources of information (freedom of information) 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and 
other expressions of preference (p. 3). 
Dahl argues that no large system in the world is fully democratized. Therefore, 
he abstains from using the word democracy to indicate regimes that represent some 
degree of democratization. Instead, he refers to these systems as polyarchies, which 
may be thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes. Dahl says that 
a polyarchy is substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and 
extensively open to public contestation (1971, p. 8). 
In Dahl’s conceptualization of democracy, free and fair elections – despite its 
importance – are not enough to classify a regime as democratic. He argues that without 
a certain degree of political liberalization and guarantee of civil rights, free and fair 
elections cannot be held. Coppedge et al. (2008, p. 632) say that Dahl’s definition of 
democracy has become the standard definition in the field. They demonstrate three-
quarters of what the most commonly used indicators of democracy have been measuring 
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is variation on Dahl’s two dimensions of polyarchy: inclusiveness and contestation. 
With a minor reservation, Schmitter and Karl (1991) also agree that Dahl has proposed 
the most generally accepted listing of which procedural minimum conditions must be 
present for political democracy. They suggest a ninth condition in addition to eight 
conditions of Dahl: In a democratic regime, popularly elected officials should be able to 
use their constitutional powers without being subject to overriding opposition from 
unelected officials (i.e. the Army) and the polity must thus be self-governing. 
Dahl’s procedural definition of democracy influenced other studies in the field. 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992, p. 43-44) use a concept of democracy that is guided by three 
principles: 1) regular, free and fair elections of representatives with universal and equal 
suffrage; 2) responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected parliament; and 3) the 
freedoms of expression and association as well as the protection of individual rights 
against state action. They define first and second conditions as the essence of 
democracy while the dimension of civil rights does not itself constitute the exercise of 
democratic power. It is rather a factor stabilizing democracies and limiting exercise of 
state power over individual and collective rights. This liberal emphasis that is embedded 
Dahl’s contestation dimension is present in other works as well. Zakaria (1997), for 
example puts liberalism at the heart of any truly democratic regime and further claims 
that a liberal autocracy is even more acceptable than an electoral regime with illiberal 
practices since civil rights of citizens are protected better in the former. In another 
study, Diamond (1999) claims that non-electoral features of a democracy deserve an 
equal consideration with free and fair elections for only within the presence of political 
liberalism can civil liberties be protected.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) establish a link between political liberalism and 
citizenship principle. They explain that democracy’s guiding principle is citizenship. 
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, a political democracy based on the principle of 
equal citizenship to exist a ‘procedural minimum’ is required. Secret balloting, 
universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational 
recognition and access, and executive accountability are all elements of this procedural 
minimum. However, O’Donnell and Schmitter continue, other institutions such as 
administrative accountability, judicial review, public financing for parties, unrestricted 
access to information, limitations on successive terms in office, provisions for 
permanent voter and absentee balloting, and compulsory voting are experimental 
extensions of the citizenship principle that makes a democracy more ‘complete’. 
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O’Donnell and Schmitter also assert that a democracy without a guarantee of individual 
and group rights is limited and bears the risk of degenerating into formalism. Therefore, 
they champion a liberal democracy rather than a limited definition of democracy that is 
based on free and fair elections per se (1984, pp. 7-14). Along the same lines, Sartori 
(1995, p. 101) argues that the term “democracy is a shorthand, and a misleading one at 
that – for an entity composed of two distinct elements.” Sartori discusses that 
democracy is about empowering the people whereas freeing the people from state 
oppression should be understood as liberalism. He says that liberal democracy consists 
of 1) demo-protection, meaning the protection of a people from tyranny, and 2) demo-
power, meaning the implementation of popular rule. For Sartori, universal suffrage 
(demo-power) per se does not protect a people from state oppression. One needs the 
rule of law and liberal constitutionalism (demo-protection) to ensure that no one can be 
harmed by the coercive instruments of politics without due process.  
Norris (2000, p. 4) as well, defines democracy with reference to political liberalism. 
She argues that democracy involves three dimensions, which she lists as: 
1) Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of 
government power; 
2) Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representation 
through free, fair, and periodic elections; and, 
3) Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as 
necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation. 
 
Norris explains that her definition of democracy is a variation of Schumpeterian 
definition of democracy since first and second dimensions emphasize a democracy 
functioning through elections. The third dimension adds the liberal component to her 
definition of democracy thus making it travel a step beyond the Schumpeterian 
definition of democracy.  
The reviewed research so far belongs to a tradition of defining democracy by 
references to institutions and procedures, which is the mainstream tendency in the field. 
For the proponents of procedural democracy, the process itself is what makes a 
democracy a democracy. Proponents of substantive democracy, however criticize this 
extreme emphasis on procedural aspects of democracy, which neglected the significance 
of outcomes for the people who are very much affected by the ways the procedures are 
applied. 
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Lawrence and Shapiro (1994, pp. 9-11) explain that studying substantive 
democracy requires a focus on opinion-policy relationship. They criticize mainstream 
study of democracy for this line of research assumes that democracy exists as long as 
voters and elites adhere to the rules of the game. Procedural definitions of democracy 
assume if the formal rules are followed, the connection between the public’s wishes and 
government action is irrelevant. Therefore, Lawrence and Shapiro argue, formalistic 
conceptions of democracy discourage research on democratic substance of government 
activity between elections. As long as elected officials meet formal requirements, their 
conduct is accepted as democratic and is not evaluated in terms of its actual 
representativeness. Neglected here are the questions about the impact of citizens’ 
preferences on their government and the tension between expanded government and the 
operation of liberal democracy. Lawrence and Shapiro say that a substantive theory of 
democracy claims to offer a correction to formalistic definitions of democracy by 
focusing on the content of actual governments and how their actions are affected by 
public opinion. Strong, sustained public preferences become autonomous forces in 
shaping policy-making agendas and determining government decisions (Lawrence and 
Shapiro, 1994, p. 14). 
Heller (2000) argues that the difference between formal and substantive 
definitions of democracy has to be taken seriously especially in the context of 
developing countries. He says that persistence of acute social inequities compromises 
the basic logic of associational autonomy that informs the classical liberal claim for 
defending procedural democracy on its own merits. In many developing country cases, 
social and economic conditions conspired to limit the capacity of subordinate groups to 
secure and exercise their rights. Heller thinks that the ineffectiveness of formal 
democracy to eliminate these limitations creates extra social tensions, which in turn 
might create autocratic political responses. Hence, a democratic regime should be 
judged not only by its adherence to rules and procedures (process) but also against the 
outcomes it produces. It is in this context that proponents of substantive democracy 
argue that a certain level of minimum income is a prerequisite for people to exercise 
their political rights properly (Knutsen and Wegmann, 2016, p. 166). Therefore, for the 
proponents of substantive democracy, a distribution of resources and progressive 
redistribution should characterize democracy. Coppedge et al. (2011) define this type of 
democracy as egalitarian democracy. 
Sartori (1995) seems to acknowledge and adopt this criticism of the proponents 
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of substantive democracy to a certain extent. He says that a century ago, democracy was 
only a political form, and the constitutional state was not expected to provide economic 
goodies. For over a century, he discusses, the case was never made that democracy’s 
sustainability depended on economic growth and prosperity. According to Sartori, as 
Western democracies developed and became more advanced democracy-wise, the 
policy content of the liberal constitutional forms increasingly centered around 
distributive issues around “who gets how much of what” [emphasis added].  Then the 
fate of modern democracies increasingly becomes intertwined with economic 
performance. The case of Nordic democracies can serve as a supporting example for his 
argument. 
 Political systems in Scandinavia have adopted the principle of a progressive 
distribution to eliminate the kind of poverty that could prevent citizens from exercising 
their political rights. In this respect, Nordic democracies are a step closer to a 
substantive understanding of democracy. Blanc-Noel (2013) argues that correction of 
inequalities and redistribution of wealth through a very performing welfare state has 
been a key element of the Swedish democracy. Joshi (2013) also claims that the 
Swedish model should be seen as a different kind of democracy, something inherently 
different than the model that is defined by Dahl. According to Joshi, liberal democratic 
governments may differ in their kind and degree of democracy. In his classification, 
Sweden is a developmental liberal democracy (DLD) whereas the USA is a protective 
liberal democracy (PLD). He explains that the PLD is developed on the basis of 
negative freedoms (absence of state-led violence and predation) whereas the DLD 
emerged “as a response to certain perceived inequalities inherent in the PLD, 
conceiving of freedom as something for all to enjoy, not just inheritors of wealth” (p. 
191).  The PLD includes but does not aim at maximizing citizen involvement in 
government. However, the DLD empowers the citizen by trying to maximize her 
participation in government. In the DLD, the welfare state occupies a central role since 
the state mobilizes the least well-off members of society and integrates them into 
decision-making processes through institutionalized redistribution of wealth. 
Discussions about substantive democracy are not limited to economic 
distribution. To give an instance Molino’s (2002) definition of substantive democracy 
includes a discussion of the rights and liberties as well as an implementation of greater 
social, political, and economic equality. He says that every regime, which has at least 
universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one 
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political party; and more than one source of information is democratic. For Molino, 
meeting these minimum criteria is not sufficient though. For him, democracy has five 
dimensions. The first and second dimensions are procedural: the rule of law and 
accountability. The third dimension of variation is the responsiveness or 
correspondence of the system to the desires of the citizens and civil society in general. 
The last two dimensions of variation are substantive. The first is the full respect for 
rights that are expanded through the achievement of a range of freedoms. The second is 
the progressive implementation of greater political, social, and economic equality. 
Therefore, Molino’s definition of democracy does not grant procedural democracy a 
complete status. He indicates that a good democracy is a broadly legitimated regime 
that completely satisfies citizens (quality in terms of results). In his definition of 
democracy, outcomes of democracy should have equal weight with the procedural 
aspects of democracy. 
Welzel and Klingemann (2008, pp. 63-65; 68-70) as well go beyond the debate 
on income distribution while defining substantive democracy. They explain that 
democracy has a supply and a demand side. On the supply side, it becomes manifest 
when power holders institutionalize democratic freedoms. On the demand side it 
becomes manifest when people prefer democracy as a form of governance over other 
forms of governance. According to Welzel and Klingemann (2008), an essential quality 
of both the supply of democracy and the demand for it is its substantiveness, which they 
define as the extent to which power holders and ordinary people are committed to the 
freedoms that define democracy [emphasis in original]. Then, substantiation is “…the 
process by which democracy becomes effectively respected on the supply-side and 
instrically valued on the demand side” [emphasis in original]. Especially the supply side 
of their argument is significant. They say that democracy often lacks substance in the 
sense that democracy’s defining freedoms are not effectively respected in the elites’ 
daily practice of power. Though democratic freedoms are institutionalized through 
constitutional laws and rights, democratic freedoms cannot take place unless political 
elite respects these legal norms in their daily practice of power. Therefore, Welzel and 
Klingemann acknowledge the fact that presence of democratic institutions and rules do 
not amount to a democracy unless the process itself and outcomes resulting from the 
process are democratic as well.  
Below is the table that summarizes main characteristics of procedural and 
substantive democracy types as they are defined by the literature.  
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Table 2.1. Procedural vs. substantial democracy 
 Procedural Democracy Substantive Democracy 
Focus 
• Procedures 
• Do representatives 
follow the 
procedures? 
• Procedures and Outcomes 
• Do representatives follow the 
procedures? 
• Do representatives’ policies reflect 
the will of their constituencies? 
What Is 
Democracy? 
• Free and fair 
elections; universal 
adult suffrage; civil 
and political 
liberties 
• Free and fair elections; universal adult 
suffrage; civil and political liberties; 
and progressive redistribution of 
wealth 
Economic 
Concerns • None 
• Goal: minimization of income 
inequality 
 
In this research, I use Norris’ (2000) definition of democracy with an added fourth 
dimension that includes a substantive concern. The definition of democracy I suggest has 
four major dimensions: 
1) Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of 
government power; 
2) Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representatives 
through free, fair, and periodic elections; 
3) Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as 
necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation; 
4) Welfare programs by the state that would alleviate the kind of poverty hindering 
people from exercising their rights as they are listed above. 
This definition of democracy goes beyond the aforementioned formalistic 
definitions of democracy by emphasizing individual rights and welfare of the citizens 
simultaneously. My definition of democracy accepts that establishment of democratic 
institutions and processes are important, however it also recognizes that the state should 
actively participate in policies aiming at elimination of extreme poverty that prevents 
people from enjoying their rights effectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
2.2. People’s definitions of democracy 
 
 
 
Cho (2012, p. 198) explains that in advanced democracies, scholars identify 
three general types of political knowledge: factual, procedural, and conceptual 
[emphasis added]. Factual knowledge refers to observable facts including the names of 
politicians and political parties, the dates and locations of political events, and etc. 
Procedural knowledge is about how to get something done. It is the knowledge that 
ordinary citizens hold in the problem solving of political tasks that they face on a 
regular basis. Conceptual knowledge is the knowledge about abstract constructs and 
theories. This type of knowledge is different from factual knowledge in the sense that 
conceptual knowledge deals with what political concepts refer to, how they are 
interrelated with or differentiated from one another, and why the political world works 
the way it does. Even more powerfully than factual and procedural knowledge, it is 
conceptual knowledge motivating, guiding, and justifying human thinking and behavior. 
Knowledge about what democracy is clearly belongs to the realm of conceptual 
knowledge, and despite the importance of people’s beliefs about what democracy is, the 
literature on democracy rarely considers the ways in which people define democracy.  
Numerous surveys measure people’s support for democracy, however the 
measures they use seldom explores what people understand from the term. For example, 
a relatively recent study reveals that 67% of Egyptians, 53% of Tunisians, and 56% of 
Turkish citizens do not support the adoption of Western political model for their 
countries while in all these three countries support for democracy as a political model is 
well above 90% (Middle Eastern Values Survey, 2013). This finding indicates that 
people in non-western societies might hold a different understanding of democracy than 
those in western societies. As Doherty and Mecellem (2012) explain, in order to 
understand the implications of responses to broad questions about support for 
democracy, one needs to question what people mean when they express their support 
for democracy. Then what is it that people understand when they express their support 
for democracy, and what political implications does it have if any at all? 
A relatively recent literature on democracy is interested in these questions. 
According to this literature, people conceptualize democracy in multiple ways, each 
conceptualization focusing on more than one dimension of the term (Miller et al., 1997; 
Shaffer 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Baviskar and Malone, 2004; Dalton et al., 
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2007; Shin and Cho 2010; and Carlin and Singer 2011). For instance, Schaffer (1998) 
demonstrates the distance between the ways in which Western observers and the 
Senegalese people understand democracy, concluding that people might adopt various 
non-Western conceptualizations when they refer to democracy. In another instance, in a 
study conducted in Uganda, Ottemoeller (1998, pp. 108-109, 118-119) shows that 
though Ugandans appear to be generally democratic in terms of behavior (i.e. interest in 
and participation in elections) and attitudes (i.e. willingness to endorse values generally 
associated with democracy and perceptions of political efficacy), there is evidence from 
the elections and in the survey data that Ugandans are not liberal in their approach to 
democracy. In response to the statement, ‘Even if many people are involved in the local 
council, it will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running 
everything’, 76% of the Ugandan sample agreed while a mere 20% disagreed with this 
statement. Ottemoeller also states his finding that many Ugandans express that 
organized political expression is relatively unimportant in a democracy. This illiberal 
understanding of democracy in Uganda is an indicator that Ugandans are open to accept 
regimes that have free, fair elections absent important features such as freedom of 
organization and freedom of speech. 
Bratton and Mattes (2001) suggest that people prioritize certain dimensions of 
democracy over the others depending on their own experiences. They explain that people’s 
attitudes toward democracy very much depend on what they learn from their own 
experiences and the past performance of democracies. For example, they found that in some 
African countries instead of liberal values, people include economic components such as 
jobs for everyone, quality in education, and a smaller income gap in their definitions of 
democracy. Canache (2012, p. 1144) demonstrates that though meanings associated 
with a liberal understanding of democracy are common, alternative conceptions of 
democracy such as utilitarian views based on economic and social outcomes also 
abound in Latin America. For example, Baviskar and Malone (2004) reveal that people 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala equate democracy with more access to 
health and education, less poverty, and more equality. Knutsen and Wegmann (2016) 
also indicate that those who have more gains from redistribution (i.e. people with little 
education and hailing from lower classes) are more likely to count redistribution among 
the most important features of democracy. These definitions of democracy involve 
components that would not be covered by a procedural approach to democracy. 
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Research in the Middle East as well provides evidence that people’s 
understandings of democracy vary. Research conducted by Tessler and Gao (2005) 
invites a reconsideration of what people mean in the Middle East when they express 
their support for democracy. They explain that their research in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
and Morocco indicates high support for democracy, ranging from 88% in Algeria to 
95% in Jordan. Moreover, this behavior is consistent across gender, education, or age. 
However, Tessler and Gao state that this support for democracy might not reflect a 
desire for Western-style, secular democracy. It is possible that most prefer a political 
system that, while elects its executives with democratic elections, does also make 
references to religion in the constitution. This argument is consistent with the findings 
of the aforementioned 2013 Middle Eastern Values Survey, which shows that people do 
not necessarily refer to a Western type secular democracy when they express their 
support for a democracy. In a more recent study Tessler et al. (2012) explain that just 
over half of the citizens in Algeria and Lebanon define economic characteristics such as 
low economic inequality and basic necessities for all as more essential to democracy 
than political characteristics such as free elections and freedom of speech. In Palestine 
and Jordan those indicating that economic characteristics are more important to 
democracy than political characteristics are even higher, with 58% and 62% 
respectively. This finding signifies that people in these countries might be more likely 
to conceptualize democracy in the language of outcomes (substantive democracy) rather 
than in the language of processes and institutions (procedural democracy). 
Doherty and Mecellem (2012) find that individual level characteristics (education, 
interest and participation in the political arena, gender, and religiosity) influence the 
ways in which people define democracy in the Arab world. They argue that 1) 
knowledge-based factors (education, interest and participation in the political arena) 
increase the likelihood that an individual learns to define democracy in formal, 
procedural terms; 2) female respondents are more likely than male to see substantive 
outcomes (providing for the basic needs of the poor and reducing the income gap 
between the rich and poor) as the most important hallmarks of democracy; 3) 
individuals who read the Quran more frequently are more likely to define democracy in 
substantive terms; and 4) people in the Arab world project their substantive desires for 
improved economic conditions onto the term democracy. In another study, Andersen 
and Fetner (2008) conclude that both absolute and relative economic security is a major 
determinant of individual social attitudes. Overall economic prosperity promotes social 
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tolerance while high levels of economic inequality suppress tolerance (p. 956). 
Andersen and Fetner (2008) conclude that the primary aim of economically 
disadvantaged groups is trying to improve their material conditions, not promotion of 
liberal values.  
I argue that this understanding of democracy by the economically deprived might 
indicate a fragile support to democracy as previous research demonstrates that these 
groups are more likely to define democracy with references to a solution of their 
economic troubles. The findings of this line of research show that people belonging to 
these groups might be expected to undermine the language of freedoms and liberties 
and instead emphasize economic benefits more while defining democracy. This premise 
is important in the sense that it also bears a possibility of the presence of a different 
kind of support for democracy in less developed parts of the world. 
David Easton (1975) describes “support as an attitude by which a person orients 
himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (p. 436). 
Easton (1965; 1975) then continues to distinguish two types of support: specific and 
diffuse support [emphasis added]. He explains that specific support is related to the 
satisfactions that members of a system obtain from the perceived outputs [emphasis 
added] and performance of the political authorities. According to Easton, specific 
support is object-sensitive in the sense that it is directed to perceived decisions, policies, 
actions, or the general style of the authorities. The performance of the authorities will be 
evaluated according to the extent to which the demands of the members are perceived to 
have been met. He explains that specific support cannot be generated unless such 
behavior is apparent to the members the polity. 
Diffuse support however, tends to be more durable than specific support (Easton, 
1975, pp. 444-445). Easton argues that once formed, diffuse support is more difficult to 
weaken and more difficult to strengthen when it is weak. He explains that a change in 
diffuse support is slower since the sources of diffuse support are found in social 
learning and socialization. According to him, this kind of support typically arises from 
childhood and continuing adulthood socialization (1975, p. 445). Then, diffuse support 
must be independent of outputs and performance of political authorities at least in the 
short run. Instead, diffuse support represents an attachment to political objects for their 
own sake. Therefore, diffuse support will not be easily dislodged because of current 
satisfaction with what the government does. Underlying diffuse support is not the 
regime performance in the short-run but a sentiment of legitimacy (Iyengar, 1980). 
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Another difference between specific support and the diffuse support is that whereas the 
former is extended only to the incumbent authorities, the latter is directed towards 
offices themselves as well as their individual occupants. Easton argues that unlike 
specific support, diffuse support underlies the regime as a whole.  
   Easton’s insight about these two types of support is important in the sense that it 
demonstrates the possibility that regime legitimacy in countries where GDP per capita 
(PPP) is lower might rest on specific support rather than diffuse support. Specific 
support does not lend any legitimacy to the regime or its institutions. Instead, legitimacy 
in these contexts is a function of the authorities’ or incumbents’ ability to deliver. If this 
assumption is true, this could prevent democracy to take root once it is established. The 
members of political system might stop providing the authority with much needed 
legitimacy when her ability to deliver goods (material or immaterial) declines. This 
danger is especially acute if the economically deprived forms a substantial part of the 
society.  
In this research, I argue that in parts of the world where wealth measured by GDP 
per capita (PPP) is lower, a people will have a higher tendency to define democracy in 
the language of economic benefits. This is a sign that these people’s support for 
democracy is a specific kind of support making consolidation unlikely even if transition 
succeeds. In other words, their support for the regime does not indicate that they accept 
democracy as the only game in town. Przeworski (1999, p. 26) explains that democracy 
is consolidated only when it becomes self-enforcing. In a consolidated democracy, he 
says, all relevant actors find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the 
uncertain interplay of the institutions. They do so even when they lose as a result of the 
democratic game. However, the legitimacy derived from specific support does not 
enable a consolidation of democracy since it is the democratically elected incumbent or 
the autocrat to whom legitimacy is assigned. Unlike the contexts where diffuse support 
is the source of legitimacy, people do not perceive institutions or the regime itself to be 
objects of loyalty. Therefore, the political actor is constantly judged with her ability to 
deliver. Her legitimacy will erode when she is not able to supply the members of the 
political system with the economic goods that the deprived parts of the society needs 
most.  
It is in this context that I argue that in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is 
low, people tend to define democracy with references to economic benefits. This 
situation might also refer to a scenario where people provide the regime or the 
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government with specific support. However in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is 
high, people would be more likely to define democracy in procedural terms, which 
indicates a possibility that the people bestows upon the regime diffuse support, which is 
not temporary. It is this second kind of support that enables consolidation of democracy 
while transitions to democracy without diffuse support bear the risk of reversals. 
Therefore, my hypotheses are as follows:  
H10:  there is no meaningful relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a 
country and the ways in which people define democracy in that country. 
H11:  people living in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) are more 
likely to define democracy in terms of immediate economic benefits. 
H12: people living in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita are more 
likely to define democracy in procedural terms. 
 In this research, I also control for a series of variables that might be important to 
understand how people understand democracy. Below is a simple visualization of the 
possible factors that could shape a people’s understanding of what democracy is: 
 
Figure 2.1. Contextual factors and people’s definition of democracy 
 
I argue that individual characteristics such as education and income would not 
be sufficient to understand the ways in which people define democracy. I furthermore 
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suggest that GDP per capita (PPP) is a prime factor that influences the ways in which 
people define democracy. Therefore, we need to account for the effect of contextual 
factors. To give another instance, some argue that democracy and Islam are not 
compatible (Huntington 1993; Anderson 2004) while others argue that Islamic societies 
are not more likely than non-Muslim societies to be more authoritarian, and there is no 
inherent tension between democracy and Islam (Ahmad, 2011; Hanusch, 2013). In this 
respect, one cannot study democracy without taking into account the effects of 
contextual factors. Hence, income equality, prior democratization, and occurrence of 
democratic breakdown and share of Muslims in the society will be used as control 
variables in this research. 
Though still a considerable enterprise, studying which factors influence people’s 
definition of democracy does not produce any policy implications. Then, the next step is 
to investigate what causes democratization and democratic consolidation. Do different 
definitions of democracy held by people have any effect on the political system? The 
literature provides several answers for this question. 
 
 
 
2.3. Which factors cause democratization and democratic consolidation? 
 
 
 
Welzel (2007) argues that most of the democratization literature ignores the role 
of mass attitudes in a country’s democratization though a long tradition in social 
sciences argues that political culture is important to attain democracy (Eckstein, 1966; 
Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Almond and 
Verba (1963) define political culture as “…attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts, and attitudes towards the self in the system” (p. 13). Accordingly, “…The 
political culture of a nation is the particular distribution patterns of orientation toward 
political objects among the members of the nation” (p. 15). Their major argument is that 
political culture, which is transmitted by a process that includes training many 
institutions such as family, school, peers, work, and the political system itself also 
shapes the behavior of its citizens and the political elite as they perform political actions 
and respond to political events. Almond and Verba conclude that a civic culture, which 
is a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality 
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exist and large numbers of individuals are competent as citizens, is most conducive to 
democracy.   
Inglehart (1988) as well argues that the publics of different societies have 
different durable cultural orientations that sometimes have major political and economic 
consequences. If this is true he says, then effective social policy will be better served by 
learning about these differences and about how they vary cross-culturally and overtime 
(p. 1229). Inglehart explains that though mass democracy is almost impossible to realize 
without a certain level of economic development, it does not produce a democracy on 
its own. He furthermore says that unless specific changes do not happen in culture and 
social structure, realization of a democracy is far from certain.  
It is in this context that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that among various 
pro-democratic attitudes, a syndrome of self-expression values (interpersonal trust, 
tolerance of other groups, and political activism) is most conducive to democracy since 
it is self-expression values that promote democratic mass actions. They discuss that 
democracy is an essentially emancipative achievement since it is designed to empower 
people. Therefore, emancipative attitudes that emphasize people power should give 
people the most solid motivation to support democratic goals. People do not defend 
democracy unless they value the idea of people empowerment embedded in the concept 
of democracy.  
In another study, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) assert their theory of 
democratization structured around ordinary people. They argue that although elite 
bargaining might be central when representative democracy first emerged, the 
development of effective democracy reflects the acquisition by ordinary people of 
resources and values that enable them effectively to pressure the political elite (p. 126). 
Cho (2010) as well says that the masses play a critical role in the establishment of a 
democracy. Public knowledge about democracy contributes to democratic development 
by improving the quality of democratic citizenship. Cho asserts that a committed 
support for democracy that proclaims it is preferable to any of the alternatives is a 
component playing the most significant role for the consolidation of new democracies. 
His research on South Korea demonstrates that knowledge about democracy raises 
democratic support. Citizens who are informed are also cognitively capable of 
developing and adjusting attitudes towards democracy. Besides, the citizens informed 
about democracy adopt positive messages about democracy and negative ones about 
non-democratic ones. Miller et al. (1997) find that in post communist countries, those 
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who were able to project proper meanings onto the concept of democracy hold more 
highly consistent pro-democratic beliefs than those people who were not able to do so.  
According to Welzel (2007) the causal mechanism by which these mass attitudes 
operative in favor of democratization is mass actions [emphasis added].  He argues that 
proper pro-democratic attitudes motivate people to mass actions that aim at attaining 
democracy in less democratic societies and sustaining it in more democratic ones. 
Petitions, demonstrations, and boycotts overlap with pro-democratic emancipative 
attitudes. Once pro-democratic emancipative attitudes are in place, they translate into 
mass actions, irrespective of a society’s level of modernization and democracy. Though 
it is difficult not to agree with Welzel on his point that pro-democratic mass attitudes 
encourage democratization in less democratic societies and sustain it in more 
democratic societies, his argument can be challenged in several ways. 
First, the assumption that mass actions are the sole path to change overlooks the 
role of other important mechanisms and actors of change. Piven (2006) explains that 
petitions, boycotts, or demonstrations alone cannot achieve their ends. Second criticism, 
which is related to the first one, is that Welzel and political culture school rarely talk 
about the role of the political elite in inducing change. Tarrow (1998) explains that the 
role of the political elite is too important to ignore even in transitions where the mass 
action is the most decisive. Therefore, one needs to study the role of the political elite as 
well in order to have a more complete picture of transitional periods and understand 
why some transitions are reversed while others are successful. For example, 
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) explain that normative preferences of the political 
elite are a major factor that determines breakdown or survival of democracies. After 
studying Latin America between 1945 and 2005, they conclude that a lack normative 
commitment to democracy among the political elite is a primary reason why democratic 
regimes did not survive political or economic crisis in Latin America. Welzel and 
Klingemann (2008) also assert that substantive democracy requires the power holders to 
respect the very freedoms that define democracy. Therefore, even from a political 
culture perspective, one needs to study political elite to understand transitions. Political 
elite manipulates other actors; they ally with some actors while excluding others; and 
they try to reverse the democratization process especially if a transition bears the risk of 
harming elite’s immediate interests and prerogatives. 
The literature on democratic transitions does not treat the political elite as a group 
whose members always sharing the same interests. For instance, in their classical study 
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O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that there is not a single transition whose 
beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime 
itself, along the fluctuating cleavage between the hard-liners and soft-liners (p. 19). 
They discuss that soft-liners may not be distinguishable from the hard-liners as they 
would also be prone to use repression during the first reactive phase of the authoritarian 
regime. However, soft-liners increasingly become aware that the regime they helped to 
implant, and in which they occupy important positions will have to make use some 
degree or some form of electoral legitimation and introduce certain freedoms if its 
eventual legitimation is to be feasible (p.16). O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) cite 
Brazil and Spain as cases where the decision to liberalize was made by high-echelon 
members of the dominant regime in the face of weak and disorganized opposition. Dix 
(1982), after studying breakdown of six personalistic Latin American dictatorships 
between 1955 and 1961, also asserts that breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not 
necessarily require the presence of stronger oppositional forces. He says that before the 
breakdown, personalistic dictatorship has an inclination to undergo a narrowing process, 
which is a tendency to center both the decisions and perquisites of the regime on a 
smaller and less representative group of the dictator’s inmates. This, according to Dix 
causes a legitimacy crisis resulting with the birth of a negative coalition within the 
regime that opposes the continuation of the regime (pp. 563-64). Therefore dictator’s 
aggrandizing and isolative behavior alienates his own erstwhile supporters. This process 
eventually ends with a defection of regime elites, the defection of the military being the 
most significant one. Only then comes opposition coalescence during which several 
actors agree upon overthrowing the dictator (pp. 564-65; 566-67).  
 Sanchez (2003) as well thinks that a breakdown of the authoritarian regime is 
viable only where the regime suffers from 1) internal legitimacy problems, 2) an 
incohesive ruling elite, and 3) high mobilization of civil and political society. Sanchez 
argues that transition in Spain and Chile was made possible with elite settlements. 
These negotiated settlements paved the way for a transitional period where the parties 
from ruling and opposing groups agreed upon the rules of the game. Sanchez explains 
that a smooth transition requires the opposition elite to negotiate the terms of a peaceful 
and safe exit for some of the members of the old elite since a contrary situation would 
make the old elite feel threatened and could force them to try to reverse the process. 
Therefore, for Sanchez, the role the political elite plays is the most significant factor for 
the success of the transition.  
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 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) as well emphasize the role played by pacts in 
the transitions led by the political elite. They define pacts as explicit agreements among 
a select set of actors, which seek to define rules governing the exercise of power on the 
basis of mutual interests of all entering into it (p. 37). They explain that they do not 
regard pacts as a necessary element in all transitions from authoritarian rule. However, 
they are quick to add that “…pacts are not always likely or possible, but we are 
convinced that where they are a feature of transition, they are desirable – that is, they 
enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy” (p. 
39).  
Encarnacion (2001) argues that the virtues of pacts in transitions to a democracy 
rest on their capacity to minimize uncertainty for all involved parties. As Schmitter 
(1992) explains pacts, by the virtue of including wide interests from a variety of actors, 
reduce uncertainty about substantial outcomes and reciprocally legitimate negotiating 
organizations and the government officials who brought them together. To give an 
instance, Encarnaciaon (2001) explains that the seven pacts between 1977-1986 were 
instrumental and successful in terms of convincing the old elite for a smooth transition 
and agreeing the old and the new elite to the rules of the game in Spain after Franco’s 
death in 1975. 
 Research shows that elite settlements in the form of pacts can increase the 
chances of a successful transition to democracy. However pacted transitions received 
criticism for other reasons. Hagopian (1996), for instance argued that pacts are 
conservative and exclusionary since participation is limited to a few powerful actors. 
Even O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) at some point admit “modern pacts move the 
polity toward democracy by undemocratic means” (p.38). They discuss that pacts are 
negotiated among a small number of participants, who generally represent established 
groups or institutions. Therefore, O’Donnell and Schmitter say, pacts by nature distort 
the principle of citizen equality. Karl (1986) argues that democracies built upon pacts 
can institutionalize a conservative bias into the polity. According to her, this factor may 
prevent a deepening of democracy once it is established since a conservative elite might 
block further progress toward political, social, and economic democracy by excluding 
new social forces from exercising power in the future. Encarnacion (2001, pp. 351-352) 
asserts that Venezuela and Brazil are particularly suggestive examples demonstrating 
how pacts, though useful in introducing democracy, could also be damaging to 
democracy to which they gave birth. For instance, he says, the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo 
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set economic boundaries that actors such as labor could not cross. Again, he argues that 
it was the political pacts in Brazil, which left the military with a substantial degree of 
power over civilians. Encarnacion therefore concludes that pacts though useful in 
introducing democracy in the initial stages of democracy might hinder deepening or 
consolidation of democracy in the longer run.  
 After this review of the literature on democracy, its conceptualizations as well as 
democratization and the introduction to the research question and hypotheses, now I 
will turn the attention to the original question asked at the beginning of this chapter: 
What are those factors that affect the ways in which the people define democracy? My 
particular focus in the next chapter will be on wealth measured by GDP per capita 
(PPP). Does wealth measured by GDP per capita (PPP) influence the ways in which 
people define democracy?  
To do so, I will benefit from the World Values Survey 6th wave, which was 
conducted in 60 countries between 2010 and 2014. My analysis shows that GDP per 
capita (PPP) affects the ways in which people define democracy. In countries where 
GDP per capita (PPP) is higher, people are more likely to define democracy in 
procedural terms than people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP). Analysis 
also shows that compared to people in higher GDP per capita (PPP) countries, in 
countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people are likely to value economic 
characteristics of democracy higher. Furthermore, analysis demonstrates that in 
countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people are more likely to have 
authoritarian tendencies than people in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher.  
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CHAPTER 3 
This chapter investigates how wealth in a country influences the ways in which 
people define democracy in that country. To do this, this chapter benefits from a series 
of multi linear regressions. In this research, I measure wealth by GDP per capita (PPP). 
The data used in this chapter and the following chapter comes from World Values 
Survey (WVS) 6th wave that was conducted between 2010 and 2014 in 60 countries. 
See the Appendix for the list of the countries that were included in the last wave of the 
WVS.  
 
 
 
3.1. Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
World Values Survey asks the following 10-point scale question to measure 
people’s understanding of democracy. ‘Many things are desirable, but not all of them 
are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following 
things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale 
where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it 
definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”’. The participants are expected 
to provide a score between 1 and 10 for each option.  
 In accordance with the goals of this research, these nine options were 
categorized into three sub-categories: Economic Characteristics, Procedural 
Characteristics and Authoritarianism. Then relevant options under each category are 
summed to create a new variable. By using this method, three new variables are 
constructed. Each new indicator is a continuous variable varying between 3 and 30.  
In this categorization, the label Economic Characteristics approximates 
substantial definitions of democracy that calls for definitions of democracy, which 
incorporates outcomes such as economic benefits in its conceptualizations. Therefore, 
this category measures people’s willingness to adopt economic goals in their definition 
of democracy. A high support for economic characteristics might also signify the 
presence of specific support. Procedural Characteristics label concentrates on 
procedural characteristics of democracy that is related to political processes and 
institutions. Free and fair elections, institutions such as a legal framework protecting 
people from the state oppression, and an equal citizenship principle guides this 
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category. A preference for procedural characteristics of democracy might also indicate 
the presence of diffuse support since people who emphasize procedural characteristics 
also signal a preference for institutions and processes. The last category 
Authoritarianism measures people’s authoritarian tendencies. It measures people’s 
willingness to accept authoritarian arrangements in the political life. Below is the table 
demonstrating these variables and listing the indicators used to construct these 
variables. 
Table 3.1. Dependent variables 
Economic 
Characteristics 
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 
People receive state aid for unemployment 
The state makes people’s incomes equal 
Procedural 
Characteristics 
People choose their leaders in free elections 
Civil rights protect people from state oppression 
Women have the same rights as men 
Authoritarianism  
Religious authorities interpret the law 
The army takes over when government is incompetent 
People obey their rulers 
 
 
 
3.2. Independent Variable 
 
 
 
In this research, I use GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
as the independent variable. GDP per capita (PPP) is a better indicator of wealth than 
GDP per capita (current $US) since it takes into consideration country-specific costs 
and taxes while determining wealth per capita. For instance, GDP per capita (current 
$US) was $10,515 in Turkey while GDP per capita (PPP) was $19,200 since cost of 
living in Turkey is cheaper in comparison to countries such as Sweden where GDP per 
capita (current $US) in 2014 was $58,938 and GDP per capita (PPP) was $45,183 for 
the same year. The World Bank website defines GDP per capita in the following way: 
“PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same 
purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at 
purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
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depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources” (2016).  
 
While using GDP per capita (PPP) as the independent variable in this study, the 
populations of rentier states were omitted from our sample since rentier states do not 
rely on tax revenue to rule. Therefore, rentier states rarely feel responsible to the 
citizenry, and guarantee citizens’ obedience with extensive benefit programs and side 
payments. Support, which is a vital factor for the survival of a regime, has a secondary 
importance in rentier states. In this respect, rentier states are also expected to be less 
sensitive to citizen demands than non-rentier states where tax revenues are central to the 
survival of the state. Beblawi (2016, pp. 51-52) defines a rentier economy is one where 
rent situations dominate, and argues that a rentier economy (1) relies on substantial 
external rents, (2) only a few are engaged in the generation of this wealth (rent), and (3) 
government is the principal recipient of the external rent. In this research, I define 
rentier state as an economy, which generates more than 60% of its revenues from the 
sale of crude or refined oil, natural gas or precious minerals such as diamonds and gold. 
To determine rentier states, MIT’s the Observatory of Economic Complexity is used. 
The project website provides a detailed account of economic composition for each 
country. 
Below is GDP per capita (PPP) in US dollars for each country. See the figure 
below for GDP per capita (PPP) (2014) by country. 
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Figure 3.1. GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country 
 
Source: World Bank 
Note: World Bank does not provide the data for GDP per capita (PPP) for Argentina. Therefore, GDP per 
capita (PPP) for Argentina is extracted from CIA World Factbook. Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, and Yemen are rentier states. World Bank does not 
calculate GDP per capita (PPP) for Taiwan. 
 
 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
 
 
 
Control variables used in this research are Age, Sex, Income, Education, 
Religiosity, Income distribution in the country [Gini Score], prior level of 
democratization in the country [Democracy Score], share of Muslims in the country 
[Muslim %], and observation of a democratic breakdown after 1992 [Breakdown].  
I control for the effect of these variables for a variety of reasons. Age, Sex, 
Income, Education, and Religiosity are important individual-level variables that need to 
be considered in any empirical study. Lipset (1959; 2003) argues that income and 
education are two key variables that determine people’s attitude vis-à-vis democracy. 
Bratton and Mattes (2001) also assert that education has a positive impact on people’s 
awareness of democracy. Other research suggests a relationship between individual 
characteristics and their understandings of democracy as well. For instance, Carrion 
(2008) argues that in Latin America, men are more likely than women to endorse liberal 
democracy. In this context, controlling for the effect of demographic variables is 
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important. Therefore, demographic variables will form my baseline model in this 
research.  
This study also controls for the effect of income distribution in the country. In 
countries where income distribution is unequal, people at the negative end of the 
income spectrum could be more likely to define democracy in substantive terms or 
could be more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Lipset (1959) for instance argues 
that lower class people go through material insecurities that might make them 
undermine liberal values. Knutsen and Wegmann (2016) also discuss that people 
belonging to lower classes are more likely to see redistribution among the most 
important features of democracy. Tessler et al. (2012) say that over half of the citizens 
in Algeria and Lebanon define economic characteristics such as low economic 
inequality and basic necessities for all (substantive features) as more essential to 
democracy than political characteristics such as free elections and freedom of speech 
(procedural features). In this respect, I control for the effect of income distribution since 
it bears the possibility of being an intervening variable that could distort the effect of 
GDP per capita (PPP), which is the major concern in this study.  
My motivation to control for the effect of the prior level of democratization 
stems from the literature, which claims that democracy, is more likely to survive in 
countries where a democratic culture is prevalent. For instance, Almond and Verba 
(1963) argue that a political culture, which is transmitted by a process that includes 
training by many institutions such as family, school, peers, work, and the political 
system, shapes the behavior of its citizens. They explain that a civic culture, which is a 
balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist 
and large numbers of individuals are competent as citizens, is most conducive to 
democracy. Putnam (1993) claims that social capital that is measured by factors such as 
generalized trust is important to understand the success of democratic institutions. One 
may as well argue that living in countries where democratic standards are already high 
make people to adopt attitudes that would flourish democratic values such as respect for 
rule of law, and a concern for equality of male and female. It is in this context that I 
control for the effect of prior level of democratization to ensure that it is not an 
intervening variable in the models.  
By building upon the same literature, which claims that political culture is 
important for the survival or the quality of democracy in a country, it is possible to 
argue that in countries where a breakdown of democracy occurred before, people would 
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be less likely to possess democratic values and be more likely to hold authoritarian 
tendencies compare to people where no such breakdown occurred. Therefore, this study 
controls for this possible effect as well by including observation of a democratic 
breakdown after 1992 as a control variable.  
Kuru (2014) explains that among countries with populations higher than 200,000, 
the proportion of electoral democracies is 56% (98/174) worldwide, whereas it is only 
20% (10/49) in Muslim‐ majority countries. Many argued that Islam and democracy are 
not compatible to account for the low percentage of democracies in Muslim-majority 
countries. For instance, Huntington (1993, p. 193) argues that “democratic prospects in 
Muslim republics are bleak” Anderson (2004, p. 197) says that Islam is fixed on a 
religious text and quasi-legal ordinances, an emphasis on divine sovereignty, and a lack 
of distinction between the religious and political realm. Critics of Islam claim that these 
characteristics of Islam make it an infertile ground for Western type of democracy. 
There are also scholars who argue that democracy and Islam are not inherently 
incompatible. Ahmad (2011) says that his case study of Jamaat-e-Islami shows that 
democracy and Islam work in practice. Hanusch (2013) also suggests that Islamic 
societies are not intrinsically more likely to be autocracies. He argues that many Islamic 
societies happen to sit on large reserves of oil. Hence those studies, which claim to 
demonstrate a negative relationship between Islam and democracy, are actually 
measuring the effect of natural resources, not religion. Hanusch asserts that natural 
resources are a curse in most countries because they undermine the quality of 
institutions and foster dependence on and repression by the state. Kuru (2014) also 
suggests that it is not Islam but the combined effects of rentier states and regional 
diffusion providing the best explanation for the disproportionately low rate of 
democracy in Muslim societies. Therefore, this study controls for the share of Muslims 
in the country to understand if there is a meaningful relationship between religious 
affiliation (Islam) and attitudes towards democracy.  
World Values Survey data provides Age of individuals in years. I use this variable 
in the regression analysis without performing any further operations. In this research, 
Sex is coded as follows: 1= Female; 0= Male. The name of this variable in analyses is 
Female. To measure people’s Income group, World Values Survey asks the following 
scale question: ‘On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income 
group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what 
group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, 
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salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in’. The respondents are asked to place 
themselves on a 10-point scale where 1 denotes lowest income group and 10 represents 
highest income group. In this research, I use Income variable without making any 
changes.  
World Values Survey asks the following question to measure people’s level of 
Education: ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if 
respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]’. 
Participants were provided with nine options. (1 = No formal education; 2 = Incomplete 
primary school; 3 = Complete primary school; 4 = Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type; 5 = Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type; 6 
= Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; 7 = Complete secondary: 
university-preparatory type; 8 = Some university-level education, without degree; 9 = 
University-level education, with degree). This variable was recoded in the following 
way: First category Education1: (1 = No formal education and Incomplete primary 
school; 0 = Others); second category Education2 (1 = Complete primary school, 
Incomplete secondary school, and Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; 0 
= Others); third category Education3: (1 = Complete secondary school and Complete 
secondary: university-preparatory type; 0 = Others); and fourth category Education4: 
(1 = Some university-level education, without degree and University-level education, 
with degree; 0 = Others). These dummy variables will be entered to the regression 
analyses separately to observe the effect of education on the ways in which people 
understand democracy better. Note that in the analyses, Education1 is used as the 
reference category. 
Religiosity is a dummy variable. World Values Survey asks the following 
question to determine people’s religiosity: ‘Independently of whether you attend 
religious services or not, would you say you are …’. Participants were then given the 
following options: (1 = religious person; 2 = not a religious person; and 3 = an atheist). 
To construct Religiosity variable, this variable was recoded (1 = religious person; 0 = 
all others including atheists). Thus newly constructed variable Religiosity allows us to 
use the religious category as a reference point. 
To determine country’s level of prior democratization, I benefit from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit the Democracy Index (EIU the Democracy Index), which 
is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. One advantage 
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of EIU the Democracy Index over other well-known indices is that it provides a 
considerable differentiation of scores, including among full democracies (Kekic, 2007). 
This feature of EIU the Democracy Index makes it particularly useful for this research 
since differentiation of scores allows the researcher to determine differences between 
countries in a more precise manner. The name of this variable in regression analyses is 
Democracy Score.  
Below is the figure displaying the scores of the WVS 6th wave countries based 
on EIU the Democracy Index. See the Appendix for Table: the EUI The Democracy 
Scores (2014) that provides democracy scores for each country.  
 
Figure 3.2.  EUI the democracy scores (2014) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
Note: EUI the Democracy score uses a 10-scale to determine the quality of democracy in any given 
country. Higher scores indicate a higher level of democratization.  
 
 In this research, Income Distribution in the country is measured by Gini Score. 
First developed and used by Italian sociologist Corrado Gini, the Gini index is a 
measure that enables researchers to see how much income distribution among 
households within the same economy deviates from an equal distribution.  
The World Bank defines the Gini index on its website: 
“Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, 
in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve 
plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative 
number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini 
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index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of 
absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. 
Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies 
perfect inequality” (2015). 
 
For research purposes, I use a reversed Gini Score that again varies between 0 and 1. 
Therefore, in this research, higher Gini Score represents a more equal income 
distribution in the country.  
See the figure below for the Gini Score of countries. See the Appendix for 
Table: the Gini Scores by Country that displays Gini scores for each country. 
 
Figure 3.3. Gini scores, by country 
 
Source: The World Bank 
Note: In this research, the Gini Score is a number between 0 and 1. To change the scale, first all Gini 
scores were divided by 100. Then, the new number was subtracted from 1. After these steps, the score 
reversed. In this table, lower scores mean more unequal income distribution and high scores mean a more 
equal income distribution in a country. World Bank does not provide Gini score for the following 
countries: Bahrain, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, New Zealand, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Trinidad, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Another variable used in this research is the share of Muslims in a country. I use 
the Share of Muslims in each country as a continuous variable. It is a continuous 
variable varying between 0 and 1 depending on the percentage of Muslims in the 
society. The name of this variable in the analyses is Muslim %.  
Figure below demonstrates the share of Muslims for the countries included in 
the WVS 6th wave. See the Appendix for Table: Share of Muslims (%), by Country 
(2010) that provides share of Muslims in the society for each country. 
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Figure 3.4. Share of Muslims (%) (2010), by country 
 
Source: Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project 
Notes: In some countries where Muslims form less than 1% of the population, the project website do not 
provide a specific number or percentage of Muslims living in that country. In these cases, I accepted 
0.1% as a base figure. In other cases such as Zimbabwe where the project website indicates a number of 
Muslims living in that country, a percentage was calculated by hand. 
 
 The last control variable used in this research is observation of a democratic 
breakdown after 1992. The name of this variable is Breakdown. According to 
Huntington (1991), there have been three waves of democratization. The first wave was 
roughly between the mid-19th century and early 1920s and the second wave was 
between 1943 and early 1960s. Huntington argues that democratic transitions, which 
started with Portugal in 1974 and continued well into the early 1990s and during which 
more than thirty countries in southern Europe, East Europe, Latin America, and East 
Asia became democracies, form the third wave of democratization. In this research, I 
use 1992 as a cutting point. Those countries that underwent a democratic breakdown 
after 1992 (including 1992) were coded as 1. Otherwise the country was coded as 0. 
1992 was chosen as the cutting point because with some minor exceptions such as 
South Africa, which became a democracy in 1994, the third wave of democratization 
was over by 1992. 
Below is the table showing the observation of a democratic breakdown after 
1992. 
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Table 3.2. Democratic breakdowns after 1992 
Country 
Breakdown 
 (post-1992) Country 
Breakdown 
 (post-1992) 
Algeria 1 Morocco 1 
Argentina 0 Netherlands 0 
Armenia 0 New Zealand 0 
Australia 0 Nigeria 1 
Azerbaijan 1 Pakistan 1 
Bahrain 1 Palestine 1 
Belarus 1 Peru 1 
Brazil 0 Philippines 0 
Colombia 1 Poland 0 
Cyprus 0 Qatar 1 
Chile 0 Romania 0 
China 1 Russia 1 
Ecuador 1 Rwanda 1 
Egypt 1 Singapore 1 
Estonia 0 Slovenia 0 
Georgia 1 South Korea 0 
Germany 0 South Africa 1 
Ghana 1 Spain 0 
Hong Kong 1 Sweden 0 
India 0 Taiwan 1 
Iraq 1 Thailand 1 
Japan 0 Trinidad 0 
Jordan 1 Tunisia 1 
Kazakhstan 1 Turkey 0 
Kuwait 1 Ukraine 1 
Kyrgyzstan 1 United States 0 
Lebanon 1 Uruguay 0 
Libya 1 Uzbekistan 1 
Malaysia 1 Yemen 1 
Mexico 1 Zimbabwe 1 
 Source: Svolik, Milan. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Retrieved from http://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/ 
 
 
 
3.4. Results 
 
 
 
Regression analyses in this section use three steps. First step (Model 1) includes 
demographic variables Age, Female, Income, Education, and Religiosity. It is the 
baseline model. The second step (Model 2) introduces other control variables Income 
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distribution in the country [Gini Score], prior level of democratization in the country 
[Democracy Score], share of Muslims in the country [Muslim %], and observation of 
a democratic breakdown after 1992 [Breakdown]. The major goal in Model 2 is to 
observe the effects of control variables before the introduction of GDP per capita 
(PPP), which is the independent variable. In the third step (Model 3), I introduce the 
independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) to see if it has a significant effect in the 
model after the introduction of all our control variables.  
 
 
 
3.4.1. Procedural Characteristics 
 
 
Model 1 shows that age has a positive effect on the dependent variable. Older 
people are more likely to define democracy with procedural references (p < 0.001). 
Females are also more likely than men to think that procedural characteristics are 
essential to democracy (p < 0.05). This finding might be due to the fact that females see 
procedural characteristics as protective barriers in a male dominated society. Model 1 
also demonstrates that in comparison to people in Education1 group (no education or 
incomplete primary education), more educated people are consistently more likely to 
define democracy in procedural terms. As the table indicates, the relationship between 
Education1 group and other education groups is a monotonic relationship. The more 
educated one is, the more likely one is to think that procedural characteristics are 
essential to democracy. These findings are also significant at p < 0.001 level. This 
finding confirms Lipset’s hypothesis that the more educated is more likely to have 
norms that support democracy. According to Model 1, religious people are less likely to 
think democracy in procedural terms (p < 0.001). However, income has no significant 
effect on the dependent variable (p > 0.05). This finding is also important since Lipset 
(1959) argues that higher income people would be more likely to have democratic 
norms. Therefore, Model 1 does not provide support for Lipset’s thesis. 
 Model 2 introduces control variables Democracy Score, Breakdown, Muslim 
%, and Gini Score to the regression. Analyses show that age has a positive effect on the 
dependent variable meaning that older people have stronger tendencies to define 
democracy with procedural characteristics (p < 0.001). When compared to males, 
females are also more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to 
democracy (p < 0.05). Model 2 supports the finding that in comparison to people with 
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no education or incomplete primary education, people with more education are more 
likely to think democracy in procedural terms (p < 0.001). Religiosity has a negative 
effect on the dependent variable. Therefore, religious people are less likely to think that 
procedural characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). Democracy score has 
a negative effect on the dependent variable. In countries with higher democracy scores, 
people have weaker tendencies to define democracy with procedural references (p < 
0.001). This is an interesting finding, which requires more probing. One possible reason 
might be that people in countries with higher democratic scores give more informed 
answers while people in countries with lower democratic scores tend to score every 
option higher. However, this claim requires more research, and it is an endeavor beyond 
the scope of this work. Again, where a breakdown of democratic regime is observed 
after 1992, people are less likely to refer to procedural characteristics when defining 
democracy (p < 0.001). Model 2 also indicates that in societies with a higher percentage 
of Muslims, people have weaker tendencies to indicate that procedural characteristics 
are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). This finding supports arguments by Huntington 
(1993) and Anderson (2004) who assert that Islam does not provide a favorable habitus 
for liberal democracies. Lastly, Gini Score seems to have a positive effect on the 
dependent variable (p < 0.001). People in countries with more equal income distribution 
are also more likely to score procedural characteristics higher. As in the previous 
model, income variable has no significant effect in the model. 
 In Model 3, the independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) is introduced to the 
regression. This model allows us to see any significant effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable after the effect of all other variables are controlled 
for. The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a positive effect on the 
dependent variable. This finding is robust. People in countries with higher GDP per 
capita (PPP) are more likely to think that procedural characteristics are essential to 
democracy.  Regressions also show that age has a positive effect on the dependent 
variable (p < 0.001). Older people are more likely to think that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. The control variable Female loses some 
power in this model, however its effect is still positive (p < 0.05). Females are more 
likely than males to consider procedural characteristics as essential to democracy. 
Model 3 shows that more educated people have stronger tendencies than the less 
educated to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). 
As in Models 1 and 2, the relationship is a monotonic one. As one moves in the ladder 
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of education, she becomes more likely to perceive procedural characteristics as essential 
to democracy. Religiosity’s effect on the dependent variable protects its negative sign in 
this model as well (p < 0.001). Religious people are less likely to think that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. In countries with high democracy score, 
people are less likely to define democracy with procedural characteristics (p < 0.001). 
According to Model 3, if a country experienced a breakdown of democratic regime after 
1992, the people in that country have weaker tendencies to refer to procedural 
characteristics as essential to democracy (p < 0.001). The model also demonstrates that 
the share of Muslims in a society is negatively correlated with the dependent variable (p 
< 0.001). The higher the share of Muslims in a given society, the less likely it is that 
people in that society define democracy in procedural terms. Lastly, regression analyses 
indicate that Gini Score and the dependent variable are positively correlated. That is in 
countries with more equal distribution, people are more likely to define democracy with 
procedural characteristics.  
  
  
 
 36 
Table 3.3. Procedural characteristics 
Predictors  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 21.425 .135   0.000 20.159 .299   0.000 21.765 .303   0.000 
Age .035 .002 .097 .000 .022 .002 .061 .000 .014 .002 .039 .000 
Female .178 .052 .015 .001 .147 .052 .012 .005 .106 .051 .009 .039 
Income -.018 .013 -.006 .153 .007 .013 .002 .597 -.006 .013 -.002 .648 
Education2 .688 .096 .053 .000 .426 .095 .033 .000 .198 .095 .015 .037 
Education3 1.225 .094 .099 .000 .861 .095 .069 .000 .514 .096 .041 .000 
Education4 2.191 .101 .155 .000 1.615 .103 .114 .000 1.178 .104 .084 .000 
Religiosity -.892 .056 -.070 .000 -.621 .057 -.049 .000 -.286 .058 -.022 .000 
Democracy 
Score         -.707 .202 -.021 .000 -3.666 .230 -.111 .000 
Breakdown         -1.247 .074 -.104 .000 -.740 .076 -.062 .000 
Muslim %         -.463 .086 -.028 .000 -.440 .085 -.027 .000 
Gini Score         5.090 .303 .086 .000 3.518 .307 .060 .000 
GDP per 
Capita (PPP)                 7.423E-05 .000 .180 .000 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.046 0.058 
Dependent Variable: Procedural Characteristics of Democracy 
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3.4.2. Economic Characteristics 
 
 
Baseline model (Model 1) shows that age has a positive effect on the dependent 
variable meaning that older people are more likely to think that economic characteristics 
are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). Analyses also indicate that females are more 
likely than males to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 
0.001). This finding might be due to the fact that males tend to have more economic 
power than females causing females to emphasize economic characteristics of 
democracy stronger than males. Analyses show that low-income people are more likely 
to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). This 
finding supports the argument of Knutsen and Wegman (2016) who assert that lower 
class people are more likely than upper class people to define democracy in economic 
terms. According to Model 1, when compared to people in Education1 group (no formal 
education and incomplete primary school), people in Education2 (complete primary 
education or incomplete secondary education) and Education3 (complete secondary 
education) groups are less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy (p < 0.05). In comparison to Education1 group, people in Education4 (some 
university level education, without degree or university education with degree) are also 
less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. This 
finding is more robust than the findings pertaining to Education2 and Education3 
groups (p < 0.001). Lastly, Model 1 reveals that religious people are less likely to define 
democracy with economic characteristics.  
 Model 2 introduces control variables Democracy Score, Breakdown, Muslim %, 
and Gini Score. After introduction of these new variables, Education2 and Education3 
variables lose their significance. Regressions show that Gini Score also has no 
significant effect in the model. In Model 2, age has a positive and robust effect on the 
dependent variable (p < 0.001). Older people are more likely define democracy in 
economic terms. Analyses also indicate that females are more likely than males to 
discuss that economic characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). High-
income people however, have weaker tendencies to think that economic characteristics 
are essential to democracy (p < 0.001). In comparison to Education1 group, people in 
Education4 group are less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy (p < 0.001). Democracy Score has a negative effect on the dependent 
variable (p < 0.001). People in countries with higher democracy scores are also less 
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likely to define democracy with economic references. In countries where a breakdown 
of democratic regime occurred after 1992, people have weaker tendencies to refer to 
economic characteristics as essential to democracy (p < 0.001). However in countries 
where Muslims form a higher share of the society, people are more likely to argue that 
economic characteristics are essential to democracy (p < 0.001).    
 Model 3 introduces the independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) to the 
regression. Education2, Education3, and Gini Score have no significant effect in the 
model. The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a significant and reverse 
effect on the dependent variable (p < 0.05). That is in countries where GDP per capita 
(PPP) is higher people are less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential 
to democracy. Age has a positive effect on the dependent variable (p < 0.001). Older 
people are more likely to define democracy with economic characteristics. In 
comparison to males, females are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are 
essential to democracy (p < 0.001). Income still has a negative effect on the dependent 
variable (p < 0.001). High-income people are less likely to see economic characteristics 
as essential to democracy. When compared to people in Education1 group, people in 
Education4 group are significantly less likely to argue that economic characteristics are 
essential to democracy (p < 0.001). Analysis demonstrates that Democracy Score has a 
negative effect in the model (p < 0.001). Where democracy score of a country is higher, 
people have weaker tendencies to define democracy in economic terms. A democratic 
breakdown after 1992 has a negative effect on the dependent variable (p < 0.001). 
Lastly, analyses show that people living in countries with a higher share of Muslims in 
the society are also more likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy. When we merge this finding with our results from the previous analysis 
about procedural characteristics of democracy, one can say that Muslim societies are 
more likely to define democracy in economic terms and less likely to define it in 
procedural terms than people in countries where Muslims do not form the majority. This 
finding might also indicate that in societies where Muslims constitute a higher share of 
the society, people’s support for the regime might be in the form of specific support 
rather than in the form of diffuse support. This finding can also hint at one factor that 
could explain why predominantly Islamic societies experience problems in their 
consolidation of democracy. 
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Table 3.4. Economic characteristics 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 20.067 .147   0.000 24.713 .323   0.000 24.497 .330   0.000 
Age .008 .002 .019 .000 .015 .002 .039 .000 .016 .002 .042 .000 
Female .277 .057 .021 .000 .271 .056 .021 .000 .277 .056 .021 .000 
Income -.068 .014 -.022 .000 -.115 .014 -.037 .000 -.114 .014 -.037 .000 
Education2 -.329 .104 -.023 .002 .065 .103 .005 .527 .096 .104 .007 .355 
Education3 -.311 .103 -.023 .002 .074 .103 .006 .469 .122 .104 .009 .242 
Education4 -1.693 .110 -.110 .000 -1.197 .111 -.078 .000 -1.138 .113 -.074 .000 
Religiosity -.448 .061 -.032 .000 -.660 .061 -.048 .000 -.706 .063 -.051 .000 
Democracy 
Score         -6.990 .218 -.195 .000 -6.591 .250 -.184 .000 
Breakdown         -1.300 .080 -.100 .000 -1.368 .083 -.105 .000 
Muslim %         1.550 .093 .087 .000 1.547 .093 .087 .000 
Gini Score         -.217 .328 -.003 .509 -.004 .334 .000 .991 
GDP per 
Capita (PPP)                 -1.005E-05 .000 -.022 .001 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.052 0.052 
Dependent Variable: Economic Characteristics 
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3.4.3. Authoritarianism 
 
 
In Model 1, control variable Female has no significant effect on the dependent 
variable. Age has a negative effect in the model (p < 0.001). That is older people are 
less likely to support authoritarianism than younger people. Higher-income people 
however are more likely to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001). Again this finding 
contradicts with Lipset (1959) who claims that lower class people would be more likely 
to have authoritarian tendencies. However, regressions indicate that in comparison to 
people in Education1 group (no formal education or incomplete primary school), higher 
education groups are consistently less likely to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001). 
The relationship between education and the dependent variable is a monotonic one. 
That is as one moves up in the ladder of education, her aversion for authoritarianism 
strengthens. This finding confirms Lipset (2003) who suggests that the more educated 
one is the less likely one is to have authoritarian tendencies. Model 1 also shows that 
religious people have stronger tendencies to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001).  
 Model 2 introduces further control variables to the model. Control variable 
Female has no significant effect in the model. Age has a significant and reverse effect 
on the dependent variable (p < 0.001). Older people are less likely to support 
authoritarianism than younger people. According to regressions, higher-income people 
are more likely to support authoritarianism than lower income people (p < 0.001). As in 
Model 1, education and the dependent variable has a monotonic relationship. That is 
people in higher education groups are significantly less likely to support 
authoritarianism than people in Education1 group (p < 0.001). However, religious 
people are more likely to support authoritarianism than people who expressed that they 
are not religious (p < 0.001). In Model 2, people in countries with higher democracy 
scores are also less likely to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001). This is a finding 
supporting arguments of Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993). It is probable 
that living under democracies for longer years make the peoples of these countries more 
averse to authoritarianism. Where a breakdown occurred after 1992, people are also 
more likely to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001). Compared to countries where 
Muslims constitute a lower share of the society, authoritarian tendencies are higher in 
countries where Muslims form a higher share of the society (p < 0.001). This finding 
also supports Huntington (1993) and Anderson (2004) who argue that Islamic societies 
are more prone to authoritarian ideologies. Lastly, Gini score has a significant and 
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negative effect in the model (p < 0.001). That is in countries where income distribution 
is more equal; people also have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism. 
 Model 3 introduces the independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) to the 
model. The control variable Female has no significant effect on the dependent variable. 
The independent variable GDP per capita (PPP) has a robust and negative effect (p < 
0.001). That is compared to countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), in countries 
where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher; people are less likely to support 
authoritarianism. Model 3 also shows that younger people are more likely to support 
authoritarianism (p < 0.001). Regressions indicate that higher-income people are more 
likely to support authoritarianism as well (p < 0.001). In comparison to people in 
Education1 group, people in Education2 group (complete primary school or incomplete 
secondary school) have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism (p < 0.05). 
Analyses also demonstrate that people in Education3 (complete secondary education) 
and Education4 (some university level education, with or without degree or university 
level education) groups are more averse to authoritarianism than people in Education1 
group (p < 0.001). However, religious people are more supportive of authoritarianism 
than irreligious people (p < 0.001). People in countries with higher democracy scores 
have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001), but people living in 
countries where a breakdown of democratic regime occurred after 1992 are more likely 
to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001). In societies where Muslims form a higher share 
of the society, people are more likely to score authoritarianism higher (p < 0.001). 
Lastly, regressions show that in countries with more equal income distribution, people 
are less likely to support authoritarianism (p < 0.001).  
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Table 3.5. Authoritarianism 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 17.035 .151   0.000 27.577 .312   0.000 25.954 .317   0.000 
Age -.057 .002 -.142 .000 -.016 .002 -.039 .000 -.008 .002 -.020 .000 
Female -.066 .058 -.005 .255 .004 .054 .000 .943 .042 .053 .003 .436 
Income .186 .014 .058 .000 .075 .013 .023 .000 .087 .013 .027 .000 
Education2 -1.473 .107 -.100 .000 -.500 .099 -.034 .000 -.273 .099 -.018 .006 
Education3 -2.500 .105 -.178 .000 -1.241 .099 -.089 .000 -.894 .099 -.064 .000 
Education4 -4.505 .113 -.284 0.000 -2.589 .107 -.163 .000 -2.150 .108 -.136 .000 
Religiosity 2.310 .063 .159 .000 1.329 .059 .092 .000 1.017 .060 .070 .000 
Democracy 
Score         -5.990 .214 -.159 .000 -3.061 .243 -.081 .000 
Breakdown         1.368 .077 .101 .000 .869 .079 .064 .000 
Muslim %         2.527 .089 .137 .000 2.517 .089 .136 .000 
Gini Score         -16.051 .312 -.243 0.000 -14.529 .316 -.220 0.000 
GDP per 
Capita (PPP)                 -7.219E-05 .000 -.156 .000 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.223 0.233 
Dependent Variable: Authoritarian Characteristics 
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3.5. Discussion 
 
 
 
Analysis shows that compared to people in countries with lower GDP per capita 
(PPP), people are more likely to consider procedural characteristics essential to 
democracy in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher. This finding is robust 
after controlled for demographic indicators, prior level of democratization of the 
country, occurrence of a democratic breakdown after 1992, share of Muslims in the 
society, and income equality. This finding might be an indicator that in countries with 
higher GDP per capita (PPP), people lend diffuse support to the democratic regime for 
they think that institutions and processes are more essential to democracy than 
economic goodies. However, in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people 
are less likely than people in high GDP per capita (PPP) countries to consider 
procedural characteristics more essential to democracy. Therefore, one can argue that 
this finding is in parallel with the alternative hypothesis H12 stating that people living in 
countries with higher levels of GDP per capita (PPP) are more likely to define 
democracy in procedural terms.  
Another finding that supports this view is that when compared to people in 
countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people in countries where GDP per capita 
(PPP) is higher are also less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy. This finding is also robust after it is controlled for demographic indicators, 
prior level of democratization, occurrence of a democratic breakdown after 1992, share 
of Muslims in the society, and income equality. This finding provides support for the 
hypothesis H11 stating that people living in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) 
are more likely to define democracy in terms of immediate economic benefits. 
Therefore, one can argue that people from economically less developed countries are 
more likely to give specific support to the democratic regime whereas people in 
countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) lend diffuse support to their democratic 
regime. These two findings reject our null hypothesis H10 stating that ‘there is no 
meaningful relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and the ways in 
which people define democracy in that country.  
Analyses where authoritarianism was the dependent variable also provide 
empirical evidence that support these arguments. As regressions demonstrate there is a 
negative relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) of a country and people’s support 
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for authoritarianism in that country. That is in countries where GDP per capita is higher; 
people are significantly less likely to support authoritarian regimes. Note that our data 
excludes populations of rentier states where the government and its institutions do have 
a higher level of autonomy from the society and a lesser need for their support for 
survival due to the revenue generated by sales of oil, natural gas or precious metal. If 
one evaluates these results in conjunction with the previous findings pertaining to 
procedural and economic characteristics of democracy, it is possible to argue that 
people in economically more developed countries express their preference for 
procedural characteristics of democracy, and they are also more averse to authoritarian 
regimes. People in economically less developed countries who express their preference 
for economic characteristics of democracy are also more likely to prefer autocracies to 
democracies.  
I argue that this is because people in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) 
provide their regime with diffuse support, and they are willing and able to support the 
democratic regime even when it fails to provide economic benefits in the short term. 
However, those who are more likely to prefer economic characteristics to procedural 
characteristics probably evaluate the performance of the democratic regime with the 
economic benefits the regime is able to generate (specific support). When the 
democratic regime is unable to provide economic growth, employment, or other side 
benefits such as unemployment insurance or subsidies for the poor, people might shift 
their allegiance and prefer an autocracy to a democratic regime if they believe an 
authoritarian regime would be better in providing economic benefits that the democratic 
regime failed to generate. This is a good example of how specific support that is based 
on outputs could also be a curse for the democratic regime and might lead to its 
eventual breakdown should it fail to create economic goods that could sustain society’s 
support for the political authority. Indeed, research shows that economic recessions are 
a robust predictor of the breakdown of democracy especially in young and poor 
democracies. When democracies break down, 9 in 10 do so when they are younger than 
20 years old or when their annual GDP per capita is less than $4,900 (Svolik, 2013).  
In this context, I argue that people’s support for democracy in countries with 
higher GDP per capita (PPP) makes it invulnerable to breakdowns while the future of 
democracy is uncertain in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP) levels. Przeworski 
et al. (2000) argues that a GDP per capita of $6,055 (that of Argentina in 1975) is a 
threshold above which no democracy ever fell. Svolik (2008, p. 155) also find that the 
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level of economic development determines the extent to which a democracy is 
susceptible to the risk of reversal. He says that wealth improves the odds that a 
democracy is consolidated. I argue that this observation of Przeworski et al. and Svolik 
might be due to different kinds of legitimacy that the regime in these two extremes 
enjoys. In countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), the regime seems to have diffuse 
support that is directed toward institutions and not likely diminish with the regime’s 
economic performance in the short or medium run. In other words, in economically 
more developed countries people are able to make a distinction between the regime in 
abstract and its performance and do not change their adherence to the regime when it 
fails to provide. For instance, Teixeira et al. (2014) show that in Portugal people’s 
support for democracy is not seriously undermined by the economic crisis, despite the 
living standards in Portugal decline rapidly. They argue that the presence of diffuse 
support in this country makes a quick decline in regime support in Portugal unlikely1.   
In cases where GDP per capita (PPP) is lower, people provide the regime and its 
actors with specific support that causes democracies to linger in an uncertain territory, 
which delays the consolidation of the democratic regime, and might result with 
breakdown when an authoritarian option promises more economic growth and stability. 
Therefore, this research supports arguments by Lipset (1959), Przeworski et al. (2000) 
who argue that a more well-to-do nation has greater chances to sustain its democracy. 
However, my findings do not support the view that a country is more likely to become a 
democracy as its wealth increases. Instead, findings of this research presents evidence 
that democracies are more likely to survive in countries with higher GDP per capita 
(PPP) since peoples of these countries are more likely to lend diffuse support to the 
democratic regime.  
Analyses also show that highly educated people are more likely to argue that 
procedural characteristics are essential to democracy when compared to people with no 
education or incomplete primary education (Education1). In addition, people with 
1 In the same study, Teixeira (2014) explain that there are signs that the levels of diffuse support for the regime might 
be in decline in Greece. However, they state that they cannot draw conclusions with the same degree of certainty as in 
Portugal because of data limitations.  
     The recent developments in Greece show that citizens’ support for democracy remains firm despite major crises 
with the EU over debt issue which forced the Tsipras government to call for early elections in September 2015, just 7 
months after the legislative elections in Greece. In both elections, the turnout rates were over 55% (Hellenic Republic 
Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction 2015). In addition, a refugee crisis, which overwhelms an 
economic crisis ridden Greek state, has been a major problem for Greece at about the same period. Despite these 
problems, Greece democracy does not seem to suffer from any credible threat to the regime, though one should note 
that fascist Golden Dawn had seen a major surge of its votes in 2012 elections from 0.3 % in 2009 elections to 7% in 
2012 elections. 
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university education with or without degree (Education4) are significantly less likely to 
define democracy in economic terms. The analyses also demonstrate that more educated 
have weaker tendencies to support authoritarianism than people with no education or 
incomplete primary education. Another important finding in this research is that 
religious people are less likely to think that procedural and economic characteristics are 
essential to democracy, and they are less likely to support authoritarianism. Regressions 
also indicate that people in high-income groups are more likely to support 
authoritarianism and less likely to think that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy. When compared to younger people, older people are more likely to define 
democracy in procedural and economic terms and less likely to support 
authoritarianism. However significant these findings might be, they do not tell us about 
how these individual attributes of people interact with the context. In other words, they 
do not answer the question if a high-income person would behave or believe the same in 
an economically more developed or a economically less developed society.  
A long tradition in social sciences discusses the relationship between individual 
characteristics and democracy. For instance, Lipset (2003) quotes James Bryce saying 
that education does not necessarily make people good citizens, however it makes it 
easier for them to become so. According to Lipset, the higher the education level of a 
country, the better the chances for democracy because the higher one’s education, the 
more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support its practices (p. 58). 
However, Lipset does not take into account the relationship between education and the 
context. In other words, would a university graduate behave the same or hold the same 
attitudes towards democracy in a high GDP per capita (PPP) country and a country with 
a low GDP per capita (PPP)?  
This same question could be extended to other individual level variables such as 
age, income, and religiosity as well. For instance, my analyses show that high-income 
people are more likely than low-income people to give higher scores for authoritarian 
options. This finding falsifies Lipset who argues that lower income people would be 
more likely to hold authoritarian values. Therefore, one major question that needs to be 
asked is the following: Do Lipset’s observations about the relationship between 
education and attitudes towards democracy as well as the relationship between income 
and attitudes towards democracy are independent of the context? In other words, would 
a high-income person hold the same attitudes towards democracy in an economically 
more developed country and in an economically less developed country? Again, would 
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a religious person define democracy in the same way independent of the society she is 
living in? The next chapter looks for an answer to these questions by investigating how 
individual attributes income, education, and religiosity interact with GDP per capita 
(PPP) of a country. The specific focus will be on two key variables: income and 
education and how they interact with wealth measured by GDP per capita (PPP). 
 48 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Lipset (2003) argues that economic development favors democracy. He says that 
various aspects of economic development such as urbanization, industrialization, 
wealth, and education are closely correlated with democracy.  For Lipset, average 
wealth, degree of industrialization, and urbanization is much higher for the more 
democratic countries (p. 50). For instance, he says the more democratic nations in 
Europe have the lowest literacy rate of 96% while it is 85% for the less democratic 
countries of the continent. In Latin America, less dictatorial nations have an average 
literacy rate of 74% while it is as low as 46% in more dictatorial states of Latin America 
(p. 55). Lipset concludes that the more educated one is, the more likely one is to believe 
in democratic values and support democratic practices (p. 56). Indeed, my analysis also 
demonstrated that the more educated is more likely to argue that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. Regressions also indicate that the more 
educated is less likely to support authoritarianism. Therefore, my first set of hypotheses 
in this section is as follows: 
H20: There is no relationship between education and the ways in which people 
define democracy. 
H21: The more educated one is, the more likely one is to define democracy in 
procedural terms than the less educated. 
H22: The less educated one is, the more likely one is to support authoritarianism 
than the more educated. 
In another study that he conducted with university students, Lipset (1959) argues 
that upper middle classes are more likely to accommodate values that are associated 
with Western-type democracy (i.e. toleration) whereas university students from lower 
classes are less likely to hold values associated with liberal democracy. Lipset explains 
that the mechanism behind different attitudes of students of stems from the fact that 
lower class people go through a material insecurity that lets them undermine liberal 
norms whereas upper middle classes do not feel threatened by other groups. Andersen 
and Fetner (2008) are agree with Lipset when they argue that economic prosperity 
promotes social tolerance while high levels of economic inequality suppress tolerance 
(p. 956). They say that the primary goal of the economically disadvantaged is to 
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improve her economic conditions, not the promotion of liberal values. However, my 
analysis shows that high-income people are more likely than low-income people to give 
high scores to authoritarianism. In this respect, there is a need to study if Lipset’s 
observations about income are independent of the context. Therefore, my second set of 
hypotheses in this section is as follows: 
H30: There is no relationship between income and the ways in which people 
define democracy 
H31: Higher-income people are more likely to define democracy in procedural 
terms than lower income people. 
H32: Lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies 
than higher-income people. 
Therefore, Lipset establishes a positive link between personal income and 
education on the one hand and support for liberal democracy on the other hand. 
However, he ignores or undermines the effect of context on individual attributes. This 
chapter investigates the effect of the context on individual attributes education and 
income while testing these hypotheses. The question is if two people who have similar 
education levels and who belong to the same social class in their societies but living in 
countries with different levels of GDP per capita (PPP) would hold the same attitudes 
towards democracy and authoritarianism. To do that, this chapter interacts GDP per 
capita (PPP) with individual characteristics. In analyses below, interactions of GDP per 
capita (PPP) Age, Female, and Religiosity will also be studied but the main focus of this 
chapter will be on interactions of GDP per capita (PPP) with Income, Education2, 
Education3, and Education4. In these models, Democracy Score, Breakdown, Muslim 
%, Gini Score, and GDP per capita (PPP) are control variables.  
 
 
 
4.1. Procedural Characteristics 
 
 
 
In analyses where Procedural Characteristics of Democracy is the dependent 
variable, interactions of Age, Education4, and Religiosity with GDP per capita (PPP) 
have no significant effect in the model.  
 
 
 50 
Figure 4.1. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for males and females 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
In Model 4, Female has a positive effect in the model. That is females are more 
likely to see procedural characteristics as essential to democracy. However, when 
moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), one sees that this effect is positive only until the 
GDP per capita level is around $25,000. Regressions also show that after the threshold 
GDP per capita around $44,000, males are somewhat more likely to define democracy 
in procedural terms. This finding might be due to the fact that in lower GDP per capita 
(PPP) countries such as India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Palestine male-female equality 
is an acute problem and females support procedural characteristics of democracy as 
protective barriers in a male-dominated society. In high GDP per capita (PPP) countries 
such as Australia, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden gender equality problem is not as 
acute; therefore females feel less need to emphasize procedural characteristics of 
democracy.  
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Figure 4.2. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for income groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A 
high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10. 
 
Income has a negative effect in the model. That is high-income people are less 
likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to democracy. However, after 
interacted with GDP per capita (PPP), one observes that the effect of income on the 
dependent variable is not always negative. The effect of income in the model is negative 
until one reaches GDP per capita (PPP) around $16,000 level whereas income has a 
positive effect in the model after GDP per capita (PPP) around $25,000 level. After this 
level, compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of 
procedural characteristics. This finding provides a conditional support for Lipset’s 
thesis, which asserts high-income people would be more likely to provide support for 
liberal values.  
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Figure 4.3. Predicted values of procedural characteristics for education groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 
Figure demonstrates that education matters most in countries where GDP per 
capita (PPP) is lower. That is in these countries, compare to the less educated, the more 
educated is also more likely to argue that procedural characteristics are essential to 
democracy. However, the gap between education groups in terms of the ways in which 
they consider procedural characteristics of democracy closes as we move up in the 
ladder of GDP per capita (PPP). Regardless of education levels, people in countries 
with higher GDP per capita (PPP) become more likely to hold the same beliefs about 
procedural characteristics of democracy. In fact, after the threshold of around $48,000 
GDP per capita (PPP) level, there is almost no difference in terms of the ways in which 
people in Education2 and Education3 evaluate procedural characteristics of democracy 
whereas people in Education1 group become more likely to think that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. Note that people in Education1 group give 
the lowest scores to procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less 
developed countries. Therefore, analysis demonstrates empirical support for Lipset’s 
thesis about the relationship between education and support for democracy in 
economically less developed countries while the power of this claim weakens in 
economically more developed countries. 
Below is the table demonstrating the details of the analysis:  
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Table 4.1. Procedural characteristics 
Model 4 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 21,971 ,354   0,000 
Age ,010 ,003 ,029 ,000 
Female ,318 ,086 ,027 ,000 
Income -,108 ,021 -,038 ,000 
Education2 ,516 ,152 ,039 ,001 
Education3 ,955 ,151 ,077 ,000 
Education4 1,011 ,162 ,072 ,000 
Religiosity -,197 ,104 -,015 ,057 
Democracy Score -3,651 ,234 -,111 ,000 
Breakdown  -,747 ,076 -,062 ,000 
Muslim % -,427 ,085 -,026 ,000 
Gini Score 3,629 ,311 ,062 ,000 
GDP per Capita (PPP) 6,140E-05 ,000 ,149 ,000 
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP) 1,759E-07 ,000 ,025 ,098 
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP) -1,026E-05 ,000 -,024 ,004 
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP) 5,239E-06 ,000 ,076 ,000 
Education2xGDP per Capita (PPP) -1,901E-05 ,000 -,036 ,024 
Education3xGDP per Capita (PPP) -2,490E-05 ,000 -,053 ,003 
Education4xGDP per Capita (PPP) 2,233E-06 ,000 ,005 ,793 
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita (PPP) -4,310E-06 ,000 -,010 ,268 
Adjusted R Square 0.060 
Dependent Variable: Procedural Characteristics 
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4.2. Economic Characteristics 
 
 
 
In regressions where Economic Characteristics of Democracy is the dependent 
variable, all interactions with GDP per capita (PPP) have a significant effect in the 
model.  
 
Figure 4.4. Predicted values of economic characteristics for age 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30. A young person is represented by the age of 25 in this figure. An old person is represented by the 
age of 65 in this figure.  
 
 Analysis shows that Age has a positive effect on the dependent variable. Older 
people are more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. 
However when moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), the effect of Age on the dependent 
variable takes a reverse direction after the threshold of GDP per capita (PPP) around 
$33,000. That is after this level, young people are more likely to argue that economic 
characteristics are essential to democracy.  
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Figure 4.5. Predicted values of economic characteristics for sex 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 Figure above demonstrates that compared to males, females are more likely to 
argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Analyses also show that 
the gap between males and females slightly increases as GDP per capita (PPP) 
increases. That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher, in comparison to 
males; females assign even more importance to economic characteristics of democracy. 
This finding might be explained with the fact that females feel less secure than males in 
economic terms even when they have the same level of wealth. This fact in turn might 
be explained with the presence of a negative discrimination against females in economic 
life. Just to give an instance, Institute for Women’s Policy Research (2016) explains 
that on average female full-time workers made only 79 cents for every dollar earned by 
men in 2015. This indicates a gender wage gap of 21%. The same report furthermore 
asserts that females, on average, earn less than males in every single occupation for 
which there is sufficient earnings data for both men and women to calculate an earnings 
ratio. In this context, women’s consistent support for economic characteristics of 
democracy could also be seen as a plea for gender equality in economic arena. 
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Figure 4.6. Predicted values of economic characteristics for income groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A 
high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10. 
 
 Analyses show that compared to high-income people, low-income people are 
consistently more likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to 
democracy. The effect of income on the dependent variable seems to be stronger in 
countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), and the difference between low-income and 
high-income people in terms of their perception of economic characteristics of 
democracy increase in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is higher. This finding 
supports Andersen and Fetner (2008), who argue that lower class people would be more 
likely than upper class people to define democracy with economic references such as 
redistribution.  
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Figure 4.7. Predicted values of economic characteristics for education groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 Analysis demonstrates that compared to people in Education1, Education3 and 
Education4 groups, people in Education2 group are less sensitive to changes in GDP per 
capita (PPP). Figure also shows that as one moves up in the ladder of GDP per capita 
(PPP), people in Education2 group become slightly more likely to think that economic 
characteristics are essential to democracy. Figure indicates that compared to other 
education groups, people in Education1 group become more likely to argue that 
economic characteristics are essential to democracy in countries that are above the GDP 
per capita (PPP) around $13,500 level. Another important findings is that when 
interacted with GDP per capita (PPP), people belonging to Education3 and Education4 
groups in countries with higher GDP per capita become less likely to think that 
economic characteristics are essential to democracy while they become more likely to 
define democracy with economic characteristics in economically less developed 
countries (p < 0.001).  
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Figure 4.8. Predicted values of economic characteristics for religiosity 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 Above figure shows that irreligious people are more likely to define democracy 
by using economic references. This observation holds for countries where GDP per 
capita (PPP) is below the threshold around the  $48,000 GDP per capita (PPP). After 
this level, irreligious and religious people approach each other in terms of their 
evaluation of economic characteristics of democracy.  
 See Table 4.2 below for the details of the regression analysis where Economic 
Characteristics of Democracy is the dependent variable. 
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Table 4.2. Economic characteristics 
Model 4 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 22,575 ,385   0,000 
Age ,038 ,003 ,097 ,000 
Female ,084 ,093 ,006 ,368 
Income -,037 ,023 -,012 ,110 
Education2 ,445 ,165 ,031 ,007 
Education3 1,194 ,163 ,089 ,000 
Education4 ,458 ,176 ,030 ,009 
Religiosity -1,138 ,112 -,082 ,000 
Democracy Score -6,374 ,253 -,178 ,000 
Breakdown  -1,346 ,083 -,103 ,000 
Muslim % 1,615 ,093 ,091 ,000 
Gini Score -,021 ,338 ,000 ,950 
GDP per Capita (PPP) ,000 ,000 ,252 ,000 
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP) -1,141E-06 ,000 -,147 ,000 
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP) 9,849E-06 ,000 ,021 ,011 
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP) -3,615E-06 ,000 -,048 ,000 
Education2xGDP per Capita (PPP) -4,205E-05 ,000 -,074 ,000 
Education3xGDP per Capita (PPP) -8,172E-05 ,000 -,160 ,000 
Education4xGDP per Capita (PPP) ,000 ,000 -,200 ,000 
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita (PPP) 2,167E-05 ,000 ,046 ,000 
Adjusted R Square 0.059 
Dependent Variable: Economic Characteristics 
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4.3. Authoritarianism 
 
 
 
In regressions where authoritarianism is the dependent variable, interactions of 
Female, Education2, and Education3 variables with GDP per capita (PPP) have no 
significant effect in the model.  
 
Figure 4.9. Predicted values of authoritarianism for age 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30. A young person is represented by the age of 25 in this figure. An old person is represented by the 
age of 65 in this figure.  
 
 Analysis indicates that older people are more likely than younger people to have 
authoritarian tendencies. However, when interacted by GDP per capita (PPP), the effect 
of Age on the dependent variable becomes negative after the threshold GDP per capita 
(PPP) $15,735. That is in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is around $16,000 or 
higher, younger people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Note that 
regardless of age people are less likely to have authoritarian tendencies in countries with 
higher GDP per capita.  
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Figure 4.10. Predicted values of authoritarianism for income groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30. A low-income person is represented by a value of 2 on income scale varying between 1 and 10. A 
high-income person is represented by a value of 8 on an income scale varying between 1 and 10. 
 
 The figure above shows that high-income people are more likely than low-
income people to support authoritarianism in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is 
low. However, as one moves up in the ladder of GDP per capita (PPP), income groups 
approach each other in terms of their perception authoritarianism. After around GDP per 
capita (PPP) $44,000 level, low-income people become more likely than high-income 
people to have authoritarian tendencies. This finding shows that Lipset’s thesis about 
the relationship between high income and support for liberal values becomes irrelevant 
in economically more developed countries. Besides, analysis shows that in poorer 
countries, it is not low-income people but high-income people who are more likely to 
support authoritarianism. This finding might be due to the fact that high-income people 
in economically less developed countries want to protect their economic and political 
privileges by providing support for authoritarianism. In other words, in economically 
less developed countries, richer people might have more to lose from a possible 
democratization, which makes them more willing to support authoritarianism. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also argue that the elites controlling the political 
system might be unwilling to accept those policies and institutions (i.e. extending voting 
rights to lower classes) that could result with transfer of political and economic power 
to a greater part of the society. Therefore, my findings provide empirical support for the 
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who assert that the elite will challenge democratization 
on the grounds that it might harm their economic and political privileges.   
 
Figure 4.11. Predicted values of authoritarianism for education groups 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 Above figure shows that people in economically more developed countries are 
less likely than people in economically less developed countries to endorse 
authoritarianism regardless of their education level. Figure also demonstrates that 
compared to people in Education1 group, people in Education4 group are less likely to 
have authoritarian tendencies. However, in countries where GDP per capita (PPP) is 
higher, the difference between Education1 and Education4 groups in terms of the ways 
in which they perceive authoritarianism decreases. That is in countries where GDP per 
capita (PPP) is higher; people in Education1 and Education4 groups also become more 
likely to hold same beliefs towards authoritarianism whereas in countries with lower 
GDP per capita (PPP), people in Education1 group are more likely than people in 
Education4 group to have authoritarian tendencies. 
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Figure 4.12. Predicted values of authoritarianism for religiosity 
 
Notes: Horizontal axis represents GDP per capita (PPP) level for each country. Vertical axis represents 
the predicted value of the dependent variable. Dependent variable on the vertical axis varies between 3 
and 30.  
 
 As the above figure shows, in higher GDP per capita (PPP) countries, people are 
generally less likely to endorse authoritarianism than people in lower GDP per capita 
(PPP) countries. Regressions also indicate that in general religious people are more 
likely to have authoritarian tendencies than irreligious people. However, when 
moderated by GDP per capita (PPP), there seems to be an increase in the difference 
between the ways in which religious and irreligious people consider authoritarianism. 
That is irreligious people are more averse to authoritarianism, but in countries with 
higher GDP per capita (PPP), irreligious people become even more averse to 
authoritarianism than religious people. 
See the below table for the details of the analyses where authoritarianism is the 
dependent variable.   
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Table 4.3. Authoritarianism 
Model 4 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 24.505 .369   0.000 
Age .017 .003 .043 .000 
Female -.101 .089 -.007 .257 
Income .182 .022 .057 .000 
Education2 -.393 .157 -.027 .012 
Education3 -1.021 .156 -.073 .000 
Education4 -2.573 .167 -.162 .000 
Religiosity .537 .107 .037 .000 
Democracy Score -2.619 .247 -.069 .000 
Breakdown  .931 .079 .069 .000 
Muslim % 2.549 .089 .138 .000 
Gini Score -14.084 .320 -.213 0.000 
GDP per Capita (PPP) 0.000 .000 -.063 .008 
AgexGDP per Capita (PPP) -1.224E-06 .000 -.153 .000 
FemalexGDP per Capita (PPP) 0.000 .000 .014 .063 
IncomexGDP per Capita (PPP) -4.751E-06 .000 -.062 .000 
Education2xGDP per Capita 
(PPP) 0.000 .000 .018 .219 
Education3xGDP per Capita 
(PPP) 1.003E-05 .000 .019 .243 
Education4xGDP per Capita 
(PPP) 0.000 .000 .045 .006 
ReligiosityxGDP per Capita 
(PPP) 2.311E-05 .000 .047 .000 
Adjusted R Square 0.235 
Dependent Variable: Authoritarianism 
 
 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
 
 
Lipset argues that higher income people are more likely than lower income 
people to have values that support democracy. However our analyses demonstrate that 
this observation holds only in countries where GDP per capita is around $25,000 or 
above. Analysis also show that in countries where GDP per capita is (PPP) is around 
$16,000 or lower, high-income people are less likely than low-income people to define 
democracy in procedural terms. Therefore, one can conclude that Lipset’s observation is 
only partially true.   
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This observation is also supported by our findings about the support for 
authoritarianism. In his research with university students, Lipset (1959) claims that 
lower classes are more likely than upper classes to have authoritarian values. However, 
analyses about the support for authoritarianism show that higher-income people are 
more likely than lower-income people to have authoritarian tendencies in countries 
where country’s GDP per capita (PPP) is around $36,000 or below. After this level, 
lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies. Again, Lipset’s 
observation seems to hold only in economically more developed countries. 
Consequently, our alternative hypotheses stating that “H31: Higher-income people are 
more likely to define democracy in procedural terms than lower income people” and 
“H32: Lower-income people are more likely to have authoritarian tendencies than 
higher-income people” are falsified for economically less developed countries whereas 
these hypotheses hold in economically more developed countries. This finding might 
also provide support for Przeworski et al.’s (2000) claim that no democracy with a GDP 
per capita over $6,055 (that of Argentina in 1975) ever fell. The reason that 
economically more developed countries are more resilient to democratic breakdowns 
than economically less developed countries might be the presence of a larger middle 
class in richer countries, which favors procedural characteristics of democracy and has a 
strong dislike for authoritarianism. However, more research is required before reaching 
a conclusion about the factors, which make economically more developed countries 
more resilient to breakdown of democracies. 
Lipset (2003) also suggests that the more educated people are more likely to 
support democracy. However, my analysis indicates that this claim has more power in 
economically less developed countries whereas in economically more developed 
countries people are more likely to hold similar beliefs with respect to procedural 
characteristics of democracy. Therefore, one can argue that our alternative hypothesis 
stating that “H21: The more educated one is, the more likely one is to define democracy 
in procedural terms than the less educated.” holds only in economically more 
developed countries whereas it is falsified in economically less developed countries. 
Analyses also show that Lipset’s observation about the relationship between education 
and tendency to have authoritarian values is correct. However, one should again note 
that in economically more developed countries the gap between different education 
groups in terms of their tendency to have authoritarian values decrease considerably. 
That is the less educated and the more educated become almost equally averse to 
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authoritarianism in economically more developed countries. Then, alternative 
hypothesis stating that “H22: The less educated one is, the more likely one is to support 
authoritarianism than the more educated.” is failed to be falsified only in countries 
where GDP per capita (PPP) is around $43,000 or above. In countries where GDP per 
capita is higher than this level, people increasingly become more likely to have similar 
beliefs with respect to authoritarianism. That is the less educated and the more educated 
become almost equally hostile to authoritarian regimes in economically more developed 
nations. 
My analyses in this chapter and the previous chapter demonstrated one of the 
root causes of breakdown of democracy in economically less developed countries. In 
these countries, people are more likely to give specific support to the regime, which is 
conditional and sensitive to the economic performance of the regime. Therefore, a 
breakdown of democracy becomes more likely as the economic performance of the 
regime declines. Analysis also shows that in economically more developed countries, 
people are more likely to extend diffuse support to the regime, which increases the 
chances of a democratic consolidation once a successful transition occurs. The level of 
wealth that might not be vital factor during transition to democracy; then becomes a 
significant factor for consolidation of democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
My analysis in this chapter also shows that income and education (two key 
variables of modernization theory) do not have the same effect in economically less 
developed and economically more developed countries. The more educated people are 
more likely to support procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less 
developed countries while evidence suggests no difference in terms of the ways in 
which people consider procedural characteristics as essential to democracy in 
economically more developed countries. That is in economically less developed 
countries only the more educated people are likely to provide the democratic regime 
with diffuse support while in economically more developed countries people provide 
the regime with diffuse support regardless of their education levels.  
Findings in this chapter suggest that in economically less developed countries, 
high-income people are less likely than low-income people to argue that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. However, in economically more developed 
countries, compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of 
procedural characteristics. Therefore, in economically less developed countries, low-
income people are more likely than high-income people to have diffuse support whereas 
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high-income people are more likely to have diffuse support to the democratic regime in 
economically more developed countries.  
The findings in this chapter and the previous chapter establish the conditions 
under which a consolidation of the democratic regime is more likely. As Przeworski et 
al. (2000) and Svolik (2013) explain, economically more developed countries are more 
likely than economically less developed countries to consolidate their democracies. I 
argue this is because the masses in wealthier countries are more likely to present the 
democratic regime with diffuse support whereas the people in economically less 
developed countries provide the regime with specific support, which is not durable and 
based on a constant evaluation of the regime in terms of the material benefits it 
generates. When the regime fails to provide economic benefits in economically less 
developed countries, specific support to the regime evaporates paving the way for 
authoritarian options. 
 While my findings support the previous findings that wealth support 
consolidation of democracy, they do not explain the conditions under which transitions 
to democracy succeed or an incumbent takeover of democracy does not occur. To do 
that, next chapter studies two cases: Egypt and Tunisia after 2011. As I explained at the 
beginning of this study, these two countries correspond to two diverse routes in the 
Middle East with regards to democratization. Almost five years after the Arab 
Uprisings, many cite Tunisia as a case, which was able to establish minimum 
requirements of a democratic regime (Kienle, 2012; Stepan and Linz, 2013; Volpi and 
Stein, 2015; Szmolka, 2015). Egypt however is a case, which failed to complete its 
transition to democracy (Brown, 2013; Mietzner, 2014; Volpi and Stein, 2015; 
Szmolka, 2015). Mubarak is replaced with another dictator who also hailed from the 
ranks of the military just like Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. Studying these three cases 
might reveal those dynamics that enabled a democratic outcome in Tunisia while 
reinstated authoritarianism in Egypt. Next chapter turns to this question. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Egypt and Tunisia were shaken by internal strife in the 2010s that ousted 
previous dictators in both countries. The political trajectory these countries followed 
after the uprisings differed considerably. Tunisia as of 2016 is the only country in the 
Arab world with credible democratic credentials. Egypt has returned to its old ways, not 
with the aging Mubarak but with a different leader, Al Sisi who also donned the military 
uniform before becoming the president like all other leaders of Egypt since 1952. 
Studying these cases with diverging paths will shed light on those factors that become 
effective during transitions or takeover of democracy by an incumbent leader. The other 
reasons why I picked these three countries are as follows:  
First, all countries had a problematic relationship with democracy in the past. 
Autocratic governments ruled Egypt and Tunisia since they acquired their independence 
from their colonial masters. In none of my cases, democracy is ever consolidated. 
However, the recent course of events seems to put Tunisia into a different path. 
According to Freedom House (2016), Egypt and Tunisia correspond to very different 
levels of democratization. Freedom House defines Tunisia a free country with a score of 
79/100, which is the first Arab country to be defined as free by Freedom House 2 
whereas Egypt is defined as a not free country with a score of 27/ 100. Different levels 
of democratization in these two cases allow us to contrast those factors that set these 
countries into different paths in the aftermath of their political crises.  
Second, all these countries underwent important political crises during which 
millions of people poured into the streets in these countries. During these uprisings, 
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidin Ben Ali in Tunisia were ousted from 
power.  
Egypt with its 82.5 million people is the biggest Arab country and since the 
coup of Free Officers in 1952, this country has been cultural and political leader of the 
Arab world. Tunisia, with its relatively bigger middle class in the region and the 
2 To understand the success of Tunisian story, a comparison with the past state of Tunisian political regime is due. 
The 2004 Arab Human Development titled ‘Towards Freedom in the Arab World’ extensively talks about breach of 
basic liberties and rights in Tunisia. Twelve years before the publication of Freedom House 2016 report, Tunisia was 
defined as a case where journalists were regularly prosecuted for expressing their opinions; the freedom to form 
associations was violated; the principle of free and fair elections was violated; and the impartiality and fairness of 
courts were contested (pp. 88-91).  
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smoother transition period it went through, is seen as the country in the region with best 
prospects for consolidation of democracy.  
 
 
 
5.1. Do mass actions bring about democratization? 
 
 
 
 One strand in the literature argues that mass attitudes matter in a country’s 
democratization (Inglehart, 1988; Miller et al., 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 
Welzel, 2007; Welzel and Inglehart, 2008; Cho, 2010). Inglehart argues that different 
societies have different cultural orientations that could have important political and 
economic implications. According to Inglehart, unless certain changes do not take place 
in culture and social structure of a society, democratization in that society is far from 
certain. Miller et al (1997) assert that their research in post-communist societies shows 
that people who project proper meanings onto the concept of democracy hold more 
highly consistent pro-democratic beliefs than those people who were not able to do so.  
 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that it is a syndrome of self-expression values 
(interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism) that will create a 
fertile ground for democracy. For Inglehart and Welzel, self-expression values promote 
democratic mass actions. They state that democracy is an essentially emancipative 
achievement that is primarily designed to empower people. It is in this context that 
emancipative attitudes that emphasize people power give people the most solid 
motivation to support democratic goals. According to Inglehart and Welzel, people will 
not defend democracy unless they value the idea of people empowerment embedded in 
the very concept of democracy. Welzel and Inglehart (2008) explain that the 
development of democracy reflects the acquisition of resources and values by ordinary 
people, which allowed them to put pressure on the political elite. Cho (2010) also 
argues that the masses play an important role during the transition to democracy. He 
says that citizens who are informed are cognitively capable of developing and adjusting 
attitudes towards democracy. According to Cho, informed citizens adopt positive 
messages about democracy and negative ones about non-democratic ones.  
Welzel (2007) says that it is the mass actions through which these mass attitudes 
operative in favor of democratization. Proper pro-democratic attitudes encourage people 
for mass actions, which bring about democratization in less democratic societies and 
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consolidate the existing democracy in more democratic ones. Welzel claims that once 
pro-democratic emancipative attitudes exist, they translate into mass actions, regardless 
of a society’s level of modernization and democracy. In this theoretical framework, 
boycotts, demonstrations, and petitions become the instruments of the masses in their 
quest for democratization.    
 The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia might serve laboratories to test Welzel’s 
claims. Table 5.1 below shows people’s preferences for different regime types in six 
countries. WVS 6th wave asks the following scale question to learn about people’s 
regime preferences: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask 
what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you 
say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? 
(Read out and code one answer for each option)”. Then, participants are asked to 
provide a score between 1 (Very Good) and 4 (Very Bad). For research purposes, I 
reversed this scale. Therefore, in the table below 1 refers to Very Bad and 4 means Very 
Good.  
Table 5.1 also shows the mean scores for Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. 
These countries have the highest three scores on EIU the Democracy Index 2014 among 
the 60 countries that were included in the 6th wave of WVS. A comparison of these 
three countries with Egypt and Tunisia will inform us about cognitive capabilities of 
people in terms of developing and adjusting their attitudes towards democracy. I argue 
that those people who are able to provide informed answers about their political system 
preferences should have significantly higher preferences for a democracy while having 
a dislike for authoritarian political systems.  
See Table 5.1. for the mean scores of six countries: 
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Table 5.1. Political system preferences 
Country 
Having a 
strong 
leader 
Having 
experts 
Having the 
Army rule 
Having a 
democratic 
political system 
Australia Mean 1.8972 2.4477 1.4462 3.4432 
N 1443 1438 1434 1436 
Std. 
Deviation .94372 .92831 .68530 .74823 
New 
Zealand 
Mean 1.6894 2.2456 1.2145 3.4734 
N 747 745 774 714 
Std. 
Deviation .92619 .95606 .49368 .78912 
Sweden Mean 1.8864 2.2247 1.5148 3.6630 
N 1151 1152 1161 1170 
Std. 
Deviation .93920 .89238 .68031 .59092 
Tunisia Mean 2.5541 3.0565 2.2139 3.5321 
N 1054 1026 1066 1107 
Std. 
Deviation 1.16061 .95801 1.11213 .72267 
Egypt Mean 3.6204 3.4218  --- 3.6926 
N 1523 1518   1518 
Std. 
Deviation .68661 .79166  --- .48564 
WVS 
Average 
Mean 2.3839 2.6570 1.9312 3.3058 
N 78727 77986 76961 80170 
Std. 
Deviation 1.04528 .91872 .95364 .78199 
Notes: The question is a scale question varying between 1 (Very Bad) and 4 (Very Good). The options as 
they are stated by the WVS 6th wave are: 1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections; 2) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they 
think is best for the country; 3) Having the army rule; and 4) Having a democratic political system. The 
last row named WVS Total demonstrates the mean scores for 60 countries that are included in the 6th 
wave of WVS. The survey does not ask ‘Having the army rule’ option in Egypt. 
 
 A comparison of mean scores hints that people in Egypt and Tunisia do not have 
informed preferences about political systems. Egyptians rate democracy option even 
higher than citizens of Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. However, participants in 
Egypt also provide quite high scores for authoritarian options such as ‘Having a strong 
leader’ and ‘Having experts’ options. Both scores are well above the WVS 6th wave 
averages. The same trend is observable in Tunisia as well. Tunisians who rated ‘Having 
Experts’ well above the WVS average also provide an above-the-average score for 
‘Having a democratic political system’ option. While citizens in Egypt and Tunisia 
provide high scores both for authoritarian and democratic options; Australians, New 
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Zealanders, and Swedes consistently rate democracy above the WVS 6th wave average 
and rate authoritarian options consistently lower than the WVS 6th wave averages. 
These findings demonstrate that citizens of three advanced democracies (Australia, New 
Zealand, and Sweden) approximate what Cho (2010) defines as informed citizens who 
are cognitively capable of developing and adjusting their attitudes towards democracy. 
Citizens of Egypt and Tunisia however do not present a consistent attitude in their 
defense of democracy as a political regime. The table below is another example 
demonstrating citizens’ inability in Egypt and Tunisia to project proper meanings onto 
the term of democracy.  
 Table 5.2. summarizes the mean scores for the following question: ‘Many things 
are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell 
me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of 
democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of 
democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”’. 
This is the question that was used to create dependent variables in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Also note that in this research, I argued that a support for procedural characteristics 
could be perceived as an indicator of diffuse support. It is the presence of diffuse 
support, which makes consolidation more likely once democratization is completed.  
 Table 5.2 shows that people in advanced democracies (Australia, New Zealand, and 
Sweden) highly rate procedural characteristics of democracy while their scores for 
authoritarianism considerably lower than the WVS average. Thus one can argue that 
citizens in advanced democracies are more informed about their preferences, and they 
are able to project proper meaning onto the term of democracy. Citizens in Egypt and 
Tunisia have high ratings for procedural characteristics though their scores for male-
female equality is somewhat lower than the scores of advanced democracies. However, 
the publics in these three countries also provide above the WVS average scores for 
authoritarianism. That is the citizens in these two countries are more likely to argue that 
authoritarian practices are essential to democracy showing their relative inability to 
project proper meanings onto the term democracy. See the table below for a summary 
of scores.  
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Table 5.2. Characteristics of democracy 
Country 
Procedural Characteristics Authoritarianism 
 People 
choose 
their 
leaders in 
free 
elections. 
 Women 
have the 
same 
rights as 
men. 
 Civil rights 
protect 
people's 
liberty from 
state 
oppression 
 The army 
takes over 
when 
government is 
incompetent. 
 Religious 
authorities 
interpret the 
laws. 
 People 
obey 
their 
rulers 
Australia 8.83 8.93 7.50 3.33 2.35 5.12 
New 
Zealand 8.73 8.82 7.45 3.32 2.31 4.83 
Sweden 9.25 9.49 8.61 2.37 2.06 3.55 
Tunisia 8.56 7.29 8.24 4.85 4.52 6.86 
Egypt 8.79 7.44 8.10 --- 6.19 7.39 
WVS 
Average 7.95 7.83 7.36 4.51 4.28 6.02 
 Notes: The question is a scale question varying between 1 (not at all an essential characteristic of 
democracy) and 10 (an essential characteristic of democracy). The last row named WVS Total 
demonstrates the mean scores for 60 countries that are included in the 6th wave of WVS. The survey does 
not ask ‘The army takes over when the government is incompetent’ option in Egypt. 
 
 These findings provide a dilemma for Welzel’s (2007) thesis with regards to the 
relationship between mass actions and democratization. Welzel argues mass attitudes 
operate in favor of democratization through mass actions such as boycotts, 
demonstrations, and petitions. However, the way the publics in Egypt and Tunisia 
understand democracy is not particularly informed. They are willing to extend support 
authoritarian systems and democracy simultaneously or consider authoritarian practices 
such as religious authorities interpreting the laws as essential to democracy. If Welzel’s 
thesis about the relationship between mass actions and democratization was valid, one 
should have observed Tunisians being particularly informed about their political system 
preferences and being able to project proper meanings onto the term democracy. 
However, analysis shows that Tunisians, just like Egyptians, are not cognitively 
informed about their political system preferences and likely to include authoritarian 
features in their definitions of democracy. Therefore, one needs to go beyond the 
perspective of the mass attitudes, and look at other factors to understand the divergent 
paths Egypt and Tunisia took after 2010.  
A perspective solely focusing on the role of mass actions suffers from other 
weaknesses as well. First, it overlooks the role of other important mechanisms and 
actors of change. As Piven (2006) says mass actions alone cannot achieve their ends 
even if the public is informed about its preferences. Second, this approach undermines 
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the role the political elite plays in bringing about democratization. As Tarrow (1998) 
argues, the political elite plays a crucial role even in cases where the mass action might 
be the most decisive factor. In their study of Latin America between 1945 and 2005, 
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) conclude that normative preferences of the 
political elite are major factors that determine the regime type. They discuss that if the 
political elite lacks a normative commitment to democracy, the chances that the 
democratic regime will survive major economic or political crises is slim. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986) also argue that divisions within the regime itself, along the 
fluctuating cleavage between hardliners and soft-liners are an important reason for the 
success of a transition. It is in this context that I argue that the relatively successful 
transition to democracy in Tunisia and its failure in Egypt cannot be understood without 
studying the role political elite played during political crises in both countries. 
 To understand diverging paths of Egypt and Tunisia one needs to study two factors: 
cohesion of the elite and electoral system preference. I argue that elite cohesion is a 
major factor that determines the chances of survival of the regime during major political 
crises. However, as Landolt and Kubicek (2014) argue leadership change does not 
necessarily lead to democratization. It is the electoral system preference, which makes 
democratization feasible at the end of the transition. 
 
 
 
5.2. The Role of the Political Elite 
 
 
 
  A large literature in social sciences argues that the political elite plays a major 
role that determines the shape of the political regime after transitions (Dix, 1982; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Schmitter, 1992; Hamann, 1997; Stepan, 1997; 
Crescenzi, 1999; Encarnaciaon, 2001; Sanchez 2003). For instance Dix (1982) talks 
about the birth of a negative coalition within the regime that paves the way for an 
eventual democratization. In their much-cited work, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) 
argue that a precondition for a transition to democracy is a division of the ruling elite 
along the lines of hard-liners and soft-liners. Crescenzi (1999) as well suggests that the 
role hard-liner and the soft-liner political elite plays and the nature of the interaction 
between the political elite and the opposition are important factors to understand why 
democratization occurs in some cases while failing in others. When discussing the role 
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of the elite during transitions, Hamann (1997) argues that in the case of Spain elite pacts 
reduced uncertainty during the transitory phase; thus paving the way for a smooth 
transition. Sanchez (2003) also explains that a transition to democracy is made possible 
when the regime suffers from internal legitimacy problems, an incohesive ruling elite, 
and a highly mobilized civil and political society. According to Sanchez, the political 
elite plays a pivotal role that determines the success of transition.  
 I argue that division among the elite is a necessary but an insufficient condition for 
transition to democracy. If the electoral system does not stimulate cooperation and 
negotiation among the political elite, leadership change might not necessarily lead to a 
democratic regime. Carey (2013) for instance suggests that electoral systems should 
disperse power and foster inclusiveness at constitutional moments to sustain the 
momentum for democratization. Therefore our second condition for a transition to a 
democracy to be successful is the presence of an electoral system that induces 
cooperation and consensus among the political elite.  
 
 
 
5.3. Electoral System Preference 
 
 
 
Ishiyama (2012) suggests that the evolution of political system is not only the 
result of contextual factors such as economic, social, cultural, and international 
environments. He argues that human choices affect political systems as much as 
contextual factors do. It is in this context that electoral system preference should be 
considered as a significant factor in the building of political democracy. Ishiyama 
suggests that electoral system is a method by which voters make a choice between 
different options. He says that it is comprised of a set of crucial choices such as who is 
to be elected and how (2012, p. 158). Norris (1997) argues that electoral systems proved 
to be one of the most stable democratic institutions in the past. She asserts that until 
recently wholesale and radical reform of the basic electoral system has been relatively 
rare. Despite this inherent conservatism of electoral systems, once established they have 
major implications on political systems of countries. Therefore, a closer investigation of 
electoral systems has the potential to reveal why some transitions to democracy fail 
while others succeed. Before discussing the effects of electoral system preference on 
political democracy and how they shaped the course of events in Egypt and Tunisia, a 
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brief discussion of different electoral systems is due.  
Ishiyama (2012, p. 159) explains that in terms of electoral formula, there is a 
distinction between proportional, majoritarian, and plurality formulae. The plurality 
system is also called for first past the post system. In this system, the candidate who has 
the most votes (but not necessarily the absolute majority) wins the election. Great 
Britain and its former colonies such as Canada, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and the United 
States are countries where this system is used. The majoritarian system is associated 
with run-off elections. If no candidate can garner 50% plus 1 of the votes, a run-off 
round with the top two finishers from the first round is squaring off is held in a 
subsequent date. This system is mostly used to elect the top executive of the nation such 
as in Argentina, France, Poland, and Russia. Proponents of this system argue that the 
most important advantage of this system over proportional representation system is 
government effectiveness for majoritarian electoral system produces single-party 
governments (Norris 1997). Once elected with this system, the cabinet can pass the 
legislation they feel necessary during their term as long as they carry their own 
backbenchers with them.  
The proportional representation system, which is also known as PR aims to 
maximize representativeness by reflecting the party strength in the legislature 
(Ishiyama, 2012, pp. 159-160). Proponents of PR argue that majoritarian systems 
(including plurality formula) put small parties in a disadvantaged position by failing to 
represent them. Proponents also argue that there is a greater incentive for people to turn 
out to vote in PR because fewer voters are wasted in this system (Norris, 1997). 
Therefore, PR is mostly defended on the grounds that it tends to produce legislatures 
that are more representative than the Westminster type parliaments. Though PR system 
has more representative power, some nations use regional or national thresholds to limit 
number of parties sending representatives to the legislature. A well-known example to 
this practice is Turkey, which introduced a 10% national threshold in 1982 constitution. 
The major logic underlying this practice is a will to prevent extreme fragmentation and 
polarization in the legislature. 
A second important factor that needs consideration in any electoral system is the 
district magnitude, with the basic difference being between single-member districts and 
those employing multi-member districts. Single-member district system is generally 
associated with plurality or majoritarian systems. In single-member districts, the 
country is divided into electoral districts, and each district will elect one representative. 
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Therefore, in this system there is no compensation for coming in the second place. 
Proponents of this system argued that single-member districts allow voters to identify 
their representative clearly and hold her responsible and accountable for her actions. It 
is also argued that this system has a moderating influence on political competition since 
candidates have the incentive to win as many votes as possible, and they gravitate 
towards the ideological center of the political spectrum to appeal the median voter. 
Critics of single-member districts argued that this system could produce distortions in 
the national legislature. For instance, a party, which consistently occupies a second 
place throughout the nation, could end up with no members in the parliament. It is also 
argued that this system also provides significant advantages to bigger parties to the 
detriment of smaller parties (Ishiyama, 2012, pp. 160-161).  
Multi-member districts are generally associated with PR systems. Unlike single-
member districts, multi-member districts elect more than one representative, which 
often vary in size.  The major advantage of multi-member districts over single-member 
districts is that it maximizes representative power by giving other candidates a chance 
to be elected even if they do not occupy the first place (Ishiyama, 2012, p. 161). Thus 
this system also protects smaller parties, and enables them to have seats in the 
legislature.  
Duverger (1986) suggests that the plurality rule (including majoritarian systems) 
encourages a two-party system while PR systems lead to a multi-party system. Lijphart’ 
(1994) study provided some evidence for this thesis. After studying 27 industrialized 
democracies between 1945 and 1990, he concluded that plurality systems on average 
have 2.0 effective parliamentary parties, 2.8 in majoritarian systems, and 3.6 effective 
parliamentary parties in PR systems. It is partially in this context that proponents of 
plurality and majoritarian electoral systems argue that these systems produce relatively 
stable and effective governments since a single party tend to become the government 
while PR tend to produce coalition governments. In this respect, one can also argue that 
PR systems tend to produce legislatures that reflect the composition of the electorate 
better than plurality and majoritarian systems (Norris, 1995).  
Others argue that electoral system preference plays a key role in fostering a 
democratic process. According to Reilly (2001, p. 20-22), two schools of thought 
predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy argues that some form of PR is all but essential if 
democracy is to survive in divided societies. Divided societies need PR to give 
minorities adequate representation, discourage parochialism, and force moderation on 
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the political parties (Lewis, 1965, p. 73). Lijphart (1977) also suggests that some sort of 
power sharing among the political elite is necessary to protect democracy. He argues 
that consociationalism, which includes representation of all significant groups in the 
society; proportional representation of different groups in the distribution of 
parliamentary seats; segmental autonomy via federal arrangements; and a veto power of 
minority groups over key decisions. Against this scholarly orthodoxy, centripetalists 
argue that an electoral system that could mitigate the negative effects of fragmentations 
in a society should not simply replicate the same divisions in the legislature. They 
suggest that electoral systems should encourage cooperation and accommodation 
between rival groups. For instance, the system used in Nigeria to elect the president 
requires the winning candidate to gain support from different regions, thus breaking 
down the claims of parochialism and regionalism (Reilly, 2001).  
Both schools of thought agree that electoral system should stimulate cooperation 
between different groups if democracy is to survive during the transitional phase. Carey 
(2013) argues that it is particularly important at constitutional moments for systems of 
representation to disperse power and foster inclusiveness. I also suggest that electoral 
systems should be designed in such a way that it must induce compromise and an 
eventual cooperation especially between actors at different ends of ideological 
spectrum. To do this an electoral system should prevent one of the actors to dominate 
the political scene during the transition. My short survey of Egyptian electoral systems 
yields that electoral formulas adopted in Egypt in 2011 and 2014 was complex and 
allowed first Islamists and then Mubarak-era figures to dominate the parliament 
resulting with exclusion of secular/ liberal actors from the decision-making 
mechanisms. Therefore, one can argue that 2012 and 2014 Egyptian constitutions were 
not the results of negotiation and consensus. Instead of promoting democratization and 
peaceful coexistence of different actors, these constitutions reflected the power of 
dominant actors and polarized the Egyptian society even further. On the contrary, the 
Tunisian electoral system adopted in 2011 did not allow the largest party to form a 
majority in the assembly. Thanks to use of PR formula with largest remainder principle, 
Islamist Ennahda had to form pacts with other political actors to draft the new 
constitution and rule the country between 2011 and 2013. As a result, contrary to the 
situation in Egypt, the 2014 Tunisian constitution accompanied the demands and 
concerns of various actors in the society, making it a more long lasting social contract.  
The rest of this chapter studies how the actions of the political elite during 
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uprisings and electoral system preference after the uprisings affected political systems 
in Egypt and Tunisia. 
 
 
 
5.4. The Political Elite and the Uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
 
 
The uprisings that shook the foundations of authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East caught observers of the region off guard. Just seven years before the Arab 
Uprisings, a respected scholar was writing that authoritarianism in the Middle East was 
robust (Bellin, 2004). However, only a couple of months after Mohamed Bouazizi set 
himself on fire to protest the humiliation inflicted upon him by the Tunisian municipal 
police, the ‘robust regimes’ in Tunisia and Egypt were swept away by the people 
forcing the same author to reassess her position (Bellin, 2012).  
The spark that ignited the Arab Uprisings was the self-immolation of a street 
vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi, in front of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid 
on 17 December 2010 (Gelvin, 2015). Earlier in the day, a policewoman confiscated his 
wares and humiliated him. The protests reached the Tunisian capital by 27 December, 
and Ben Ali fled the country when the Tunisian military refused to fire on protesters, 
leaving the country in the hands of a caretaker government. 
The waves that shook Ben Ali off his seat reached Egypt in January 2011. The 
organizing groups ‘6th April’ and ‘We are all Khaled Said’ (a group that was formed in 
reaction to the killing of an everyday Egyptian youth by the police in Summer 2010 
because he refused to be an informant for the police) asked their supporters to march to 
the downtown Cairo on the Egyptian Police Day (Osman, 2013; Gelvin, 2015). The date 
of the call for demonstrations was not coincidental. Organizers chose 25 January as 
their ‘day of rage’ to protest Mubarak’s 2009 decision to declare this day as a day of 
celebration of the police forces, which was arguably the most hated institution in Egypt. 
By 28 January 2011, hundreds of thousands of protestors were defying the regime and 
its leader not only in Cairo, but also in Alexandria, Suez, and other cities in the Nile 
Delta (Osman, 2013). On 11 February 2011, Vice-President General Suleiman 
announced that President Mubarak abdicated his seat, leaving hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptians jubilant all along the Nile Delta. 
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One major factor that made Egyptian Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian Ben Ali 
vulnerable to large-scale protests was the divisions among the ruling elite in these 
countries. In Egypt and Tunisia, the ruling elite did not protect its cohesion in the face 
of large-scale protests causing a leadership change in both countries.  
Stepan (1986, p. 72) says that in any authoritarian regime, the security apparatus 
especially the military plays a major role. For example, the Spanish military was a 
major pillar of the Francoist regime just like the Spanish judiciary (Nassif, 2016). Major 
work in political science also shows that the military plays important roles both in 
transitions to democracy as well as in breakdown of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1978; 
O’Donnell et al., 1986; Stepan, 1988). In this respect, a discussion the role the military 
played in these two cases is essential to understand what happened. Kienle (2012) 
argues that the military, which was important components if not major pillars of the 
anciens regimes, facilitated the course of events both in Egypt and Tunisia. 
 
 
 
5.4.1. Egypt 
 
 
The reason why Egyptian military intervened to the crisis prompted by large-
scale protests was to protect its own institutional interests. The Egyptian military is a 
key economic actor, which has its own industries (Kienle, 2012), which are 
institutionalized and well integrated with the Egyptian economy (Mietzner, 2014, p. 
448). The Egyptian military might be controlling as much as 40% of the economy, and 
according to the IMF, it oversees around half of all Egyptian manufacturing. It has 
investments in a variety of sectors ranging from production of consumer goods (like 
washing machines and refrigerators) to dairy and real estate businesses (Gelvin, 2015). 
Washington sends about $2 billion a year to Cairo, most of which used for the Egyptian 
Army (Cambanis, 2015, p. 25).  
Mubarak decided to deploy the military on 28 January 2011 when his Ministry 
of Interior allegedly refused his order to authorize the police to use live ammunition 
(Gelvin, 2015). The military was deployed across Cairo and most large cities to ‘restore 
order and protect constitutional legitimacy’. Unlike the police forces, the Egyptian army 
was revered and trusted by the people. (Osman, 2013, p. 4). It was enjoying high levels 
of popularity throughout the Mubarak years, setting it apart from other regime 
institutions including the president himself. Mietzner (2014) argues that this popularity 
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of the Egyptian military was partly due to Mubarak’s strategy of excluding the military 
from the regime’s apparatus of repression. In addition to that the Egyptian military 
enjoys a legitimacy, which was inherited from its partial success during the 1973 war 
with Israel. Over the years, Mubarak became the representative of a new power 
structure dominated by some of the country’s most powerful financial centers instead of 
being the military establishment’s representative, which actually was the case especially 
during the Nasser years (Osman, 2013, p. 212). In this context it was not surprising that 
upon the military’s arrival to downtown Cairo, the protesters welcomed their presence 
with ‘The army and the people are one hand’ chants. The Egyptian military distanced 
itself from the regime immediately by declaring that they would not shoot at the 
protesters. However, they were not willing to abandon Mubarak right away either. 
Indeed, faced with the January protests, the Egyptian army first tried to contain the 
events by marginalizing some regime actors such as the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), the police, and the state media (Kienle, 2012).  
As Cambanis (2015, p. 65) explains the army brass did not intend to back 
Mubarak but it was not going to join the revolution either. Its interests demanded a 
peaceful solution to the protests, which would not harm their economic interests and 
privileged position in the state apparatus. However, the military decided to turn its back 
to Mubarak when it was understood that its interests are best served without Mubarak, 
who was not able to diffuse the crisis and whose abdication was the primary demand of 
the protesters (Kienle, 2012; Mietzner, 2014; Cambanis, 2015). Therefore, they forced 
the resignation of Mubarak on Friday, 11 February 2011. The Vice-President 
announced on live TV that the President delegated his authority to the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (the SCAF). Over the next 18 months, the SCAF ruled the country 
until a new president was elected in Egypt’s first-ever free presidential elections. In 
June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) became 
the first civilian president of the country with slightly over 51% of the votes in the 
second round of the elections. The election process itself was highly controlled by the 
military. For example, the MB’s first choice for the presidential seat, Mohammed 
Khairat Saad el-Shater, a wealthy businessmen and the financier of the MB was vetoed 
by the military. The military also passed some important decrees such as the one that 
would avoid any civilian oversight of the military budget (Kienle, 2012; Cambanis, 
2015). Osman (2013, p. 244) explains that the détente between the MB and the military 
signified a meeting of interests between the two most powerful actors in the post-
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Mubarak era. The military wanted to protect its political privileges and economic 
interests that faced a possible harm during the uprisings while the MB finally wanted to 
match its economic and organizational might with political authority that would allow 
them to herd the Egyptian society into the path of an Islamic society.   
 
 
 
5.4.2. Tunisia 
 
 
Tunisian military is the exact opposite of the Egyptian army. It was established 
in 1956. Unlike neighboring Algerian and Moroccan militaries, the Tunisian army did 
not fight an independence war with the French. Instead the founding father of Tunisia, 
Bourguiba negotiated independence from France on behalf of the Tunisians (Gelvin, 
2015, p. 68). Again unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military is highly 
apolitical. Despite its small size and modest resources, the Tunisian military has a 
reputation for being well-managed and professional since the country gained its 
independence. The officers of the military mostly belong to Tunisia’s educated, 
politically conscious middle class, and their family background lies with the country’s 
urban elite (Jebnoun, 2014). As an example testifying to professionalism of the armed 
forces, the Tunisian military did not stage a coup d’état when the police forces were 
unable to contain large-scale protests in 1978, 1980, 1984, and 2008 (Aleya-Sghaier, 
2012). Tunisian leader Ben Ali’s regime rested on the police forces, which exceed 
120,000 people, in contrast to Tunisian army’s 35,000 men. Therefore, in a contrasting 
example to the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military was small but it was a 
professional institution just like its counterpart in Egypt (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; Lynch, 
2013; Gelvin, 2015).  
Jebnoun (2014) argues that it was not thousands who were responsible for the 
success of the Tunisian uprisings. He says that the demise of the old autocrat was the 
outcome of “… his misreading of the civil–military relations, as well as his own 
ambiguous perception of the military as a protector and potential threat that led to a lack 
of loyalty on the side of senior army officers” (p. 296). Lynch (2013) explains that the 
endgame in Tunisia rested with the decisions of the independent military, which first 
refused to use live ammunition against the protesters, then moved to push Ben Ali out 
of power (p. 79). During the most critical hours of the uprising, the Army Chief of Staff 
of the Tunisian military, General Rachid Ammar materialized his support for the 
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uprising by yelling through a megaphone to more than 1,000 protestors near his office: 
“Our revolution is your revolution. We will protect the revolution”. Shortly after this 
statement, the military withdrew from its positions defending the capital city Tunis; and 
a day later on 14 January 2011, Ben Ali left the country for Saudi Arabia with his 
much-despised wife. The military’s decision to side with the protesters was visible even 
before this announcement as it protected the civilian protesters from violence in the 
hands of the police several times (Kirkpatrick, 2011).  
Jebnoun (2014) argues that Ben Ali’s marginalization of the armed forces and 
his extreme reliance on the police forces was a major factor that alienated the military 
from the regime and undermined its support of Ben Ali during the uprisings. Gelvin 
(2015) says that like his predecessor Bourguiba, Ben Ali also deliberately kept the army 
small and out of politics even though he was also coming from the military ranks. 
During his reign, Ben Ali depended on security forces he controlled directly or 
indirectly. The fact that the military and the state apparatus did not share any common 
interest, that conscripts did not fire on their relatives and neighbors, and there was no 
brotherly love between the military and the regime made the military defect from the 
regime and side with the protesters during the darkest hours for the Ben Ali regime, thus 
putting an end to his regime in a matter of days.  
 
 
 
5.5. The Fate of Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
 
 
 Landolt and Kubicek (2014) could not be more correct when they argue that 
democracy is not the inevitable outcome of transitions. They explain that transition and 
consolidation are two distinct moments that are separated by a significant time period, 
during which the final outcome is uncertain. A strong factor that prevents a return to an 
autocracy during a transition is the electoral system preference.  
 
 
 
5.5.1. Egypt 
 
 
Egyptian electoral system that was adopted in 2011 did not enhance cooperation 
in the post-Mubarak Egypt. On the contrary, the law enabled the MB to dominate the 
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parliament, and polarize an already divided society even further. The fact that electoral 
system did not see much improvement in terms of its ability to foster cooperation and 
negotiation among major political actors of the Egyptian political theater was a major 
reason underlying the failure of the Egyptian transition. 
Before the uprisings, a report in 2011 argued that electoral system in Egypt had 
serious flaws causing important problems for holding of free and fair elections in this 
country (Democracy Reporting International, 2007). First, there was a state of 
emergency declared in 1981, which did not allow opposition actors to enjoy a full 
enjoyment of their political rights such as freedom of assembly, association, and 
expression. In Mubarak’s Egypt, elections for the lower legislative body employed a 
modified nation-wide single-member district system (SMD), in which two winners were 
chosen from each district (Faris, 2012). As Faris explains, the SMD system has 
important flaws in its application; gross and intentional malapportionment being the 
most significant one. Just to give an instance, rural areas were privileged with small size 
district sizes while urban centers such as Cairo, Alexandria, and Aswan were given 
fewer representatives per person because these large cities were more likely to 
accommodate liberal parties. The Mubarak-era party system was also hyper-
personalized and devoid of any ideological struggles. Politicians were mainly focusing 
on providing material benefits to their home districts to the detriment of any kind of 
legislative platform (Faris, 2012, p. 141). The whole electoral system was designed to 
give a competitive edge to Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), which was a 
non-programmatic party, offering voters nothing but executive competence and stability 
in the political and economic system. In 2005, constitutional amendments allowed some 
room for a multiparty system but elections continued to remain uncompetitive for both 
the parliament and the presidency (The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2016).  
 In the post-Mubarak era, major actors understood that election rules would 
deeply influence the outcomes and shape of the political struggles to come. While the 
revolutionary actors pushed for a change in electoral system and replacement of the 
SMD system with PR, the SCAF suspended the 1971 constitution paving the way for 
new legislation on 13 February 13 2011. However, despite the pressure of the 
revolutionary actors, the SCAF implemented a more complex system, which employed 
the majoritarian system and PR at the same time.  
The electoral system that was implemented after the 2011 uprisings was 
extremely complicated (The Carter Center, 2012). On 25 September 2011, the SCAF 
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introduced an amendment to Article 38 that introduced a mixed system using PR and 
majoritarian system simultaneously. The new law stated that 2/3 of the legislature (332 
seats) was to be elected with PR in closed and blocked lists. Only registered political 
parties were allowed to compete for these 332 seats. The remaining 1/3 of the 
legislature (166 seats) was to be elected with the SMD system where each electoral 
district elected two members (Szmolka, 2014). Both party members and independents 
were allowed to contest for these seats. Each two-seat majoritarian district had to elect 
at least one candidate who was either a worker or a peasant. The same rule was applied 
to the candidates who were elected through PR as well; at least 50% should be either 
workers or peasants (The Carter Center, 2012). The new legislation also introduced a 
judiciary supervision of all elections in Egypt  (International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, 2013). Consequently, in 2011 parliamentary elections, 332 lower house seats 
were elected by proportional representation. The remaining 166 seats were chosen with 
the SMD system (Reuters, 2011). In 2011 parliamentary elections, the SCAF opted for 
0.5% threshold (the lowest of its kind) for proportional list districts, which was an 
attempt by the SCAF to disincentivize the formation of electoral coalitions (Tavana, 
2012). This strategy of the SCAF seems to work out as more than 40 parties competed 
in 2011 parliamentary elections. The top five political parties (Freedom and Justice 
Party, Al Nour, Egyptian Bloc, Al Wafd, and Al Wasat) received 84.6% of the popular 
vote. Other than Egyptian Bloc that received 8.9% of the votes in 2011 parliamentary 
elections, the other parties were either affiliated with actors such as the MB (Freedom 
and Justice Party) or Salafis (Al Nour Party) who already had a formidable presence in 
Egypt before the uprising or they were political parties which had its roots back in pre-
uprising era. Therefore, the Egyptian Bloc, the only party, which could claim some 
revolutionary credentials, did not show a strong presence in the first free elections of 
Egyptian history. 
Tavana (2012) argues that the electoral system formula designed by the SCAF 
had the unintended consequence of providing an electoral cushion to the strongest party 
in the country. Trager (2011) argues that the largest remainder system3 that is used 
Egypt made it virtually impossible for smaller parties to compete against larger and 
mostly illiberal parties since only those parties that meet or exceed the quota of votes 
3 Lijphart (1994) explains that in largest remainder system the first step is to calculate a quota of votes that entitles 
parties to a seat in the parliament. A party will get as many seats as it has quotas of votes. Then any unallocated seats 
are given to those parties having the largest number of unused votes (largest remainders).   
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for a given district will be able to win seats in this system. According to him, the system 
significantly hampers newer parties in the parliamentary elections as makes it unlikely 
that small and still-forming parties will be able to compete effectively. In addition, 
Trager suggested that the closed party-list structure that was envisaged for the election 
of 2/3 of the legislature might significantly advantage the Islamist Freedom and Justice 
Party, which was the only political force with organizational capabilities after 
Mubarak’s NDP was abolished.  
The results of the November 2011 parliamentary elections proved Trager right. 
Freedom and Justice Party despite getting 36.4% of the vote controlled 45.2% (235 
seats out of the 498 contested) in the 2011 parliamentary elections. After the elections, 
two biggest parties the FJP and Al Nour Party controlled 70% of the parliament; thereby 
eliminating any chance of a meaningful party competition in the legislature. Smaller 
liberal parties, which were unwilling to cooperate with the Salafist Al Nour Party, could 
not successfully challenge the hegemony of Freedom and Justice Party. Therefore after 
the first free elections of the Egyptian history, there would be no legislation by 
consensus or even minority consultation. The MB’s Freedom and Justice Party and 
Salafis’ Al Nour installed supermajorities on every committee; thus excluding liberal/ 
secular actors from the policy-making right from the beginning (Cambanis, 2015, p. 
169). The situation became even more untenable after Morsi’s election to the presidency 
in June 2012 with slightly over 51% of the votes in the second round of the presidential 
elections. Especially after this victory, Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party, which won 
both elections became even more uncompromising, and excluded liberal/ secular actors 
from the political process between 2011 and 2013 thereby effectively blocking any 
chance for a negotiated transition to democracy.  
To sum up, several features of the 2011 electoral system made it less of a useful 
tool to promote a smooth transition to democracy. First, it was extremely complex. The 
system accommodated both PR and majoritarian system simultaneously. 2/3 of the 
legislature was elected with PR while the rest was elected with majority run-off formula 
where each district elected two candidates. The system also enforced a quota for 
farmers and peasants in districts where majority run-off formula was used. In addition, 
the largest remainder system in districts where PR was used provided large and illiberal 
parties such as FJP and Salafist Al Nour Party with important advantages over small 
parties. As a result, the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party did not feel the need to 
negotiate the terms of the transition with liberal/ secular actors. This created a political 
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atmosphere where Islamists dominated the legislature and the constituent assembly that 
drafted the 2012 Egyptian constitution (Cambanis, 2012; Gelvin, 2015). This situation 
in return alienated secular actors letting a considerable part of the Egyptian society to 
support the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement, which emerged in 2013 with the support of 
the military intelligence and the police as well as funding by the Mubarak-era business 
tycoons (Stacher, 2015, p. 268). This organization that allegedly collected more than 22 
million signatures demanding a resignation of Morsi, took it to the streets in 30 June 
2013, which was the first year anniversary of inauguration of Morsi as the new 
president. The clashes between the supporters of the MB and the Tamarod continued for 
several days. The military used these clashes and Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies such as his 23 November 2012 presidential decree granting him powers to 
issue any decision or law without any alternative authority in the country having the 
power to oppose or revoke it (Sabry, 2013) as excuses to stage a coup against him in 
July 2013 putting an end to Egypt’s short experiment with democracy. Therefore, the 
electoral system that was implemented after the uprisings hardly stimulated cooperation 
and negotiation among the major political actors of Egypt. Instead, the 2011 electoral 
system strengthened divisions between Islamists and seculars and furthered polarization 
in the Egyptian society. 
The second electoral system that was used after the 2011 uprisings was 
implemented in 2014; one year after June 2013 military coup which overthrew Morsi, 
the first civilian president of Egypt. Morsy (2014) explains that the new law again 
establishes a mixed electoral system and increases the number of representatives from 
508 to 567. Of these 567, 420 members will be elected as individuals while the rest (120 
members) will be elected from closed lists wherein the winning list in a district takes all 
seats in that district. The 2014 law also states that the president will appoint 27 
members to the parliament. This new law was perceived as a setback for democracy by 
several analysts (Dawoud, 2014; Morsy, 2014; Morsy, 2015; Volkel, 2015). Dawoud 
(2014) argued that the new electoral law was a major upset for people who hoped to 
build a genuine democratic, pluralistic system. According to him, the law-makers 
deliberately designed the new election law since its emphasis on the individual system 
gave them greater leverage on who stands a chance to enter the parliament, amid a wide 
crackdown against the MB. Morsy (2014; 2015) suggested that the new electoral system 
and district divisions tainted by suspicions of gerrymandering gave individuals who 
were associated with Mubarak’s National Democratic Party the upper hand in the 
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elections. He argues that these actors were recognized as the most organized and 
experienced group after the suppression of the MB not only because of their good 
relations with the state institutions and but also thanks to their links with the prominent 
tribes and families of the Upper Egypt. Morsy (2014; 2015) also explains that the 2014 
electoral law caused a further weakening of political parties because the system 
stipulated that a great majority of the members of the legislature would be elected 
through the individual candidate system. Therefore, the new system empowered old 
networks of the Mubarak era, which were based on family and business ties, at the 
expense of political parties. Besides, for 120 seats allocated to political parties, the 2014 
electoral law preferred closed lists to proportional lists. In this formula, a winning party 
or coalition could win all seats in the designated district if it takes 50%, plus one vote. If 
no party or coalition can garner enough votes, two lists with the highest number of votes 
will compete in a run-off round. It is in this context that Morsy (2014) argues that 
application of the electoral law signifies a major departure from the principle of popular 
representation and the people’s vote.  
The extremely low turn out rates in 2015 parliamentary elections might be an 
indicator that Egyptian people lost their confidence in elections. Volkel (2015) explains 
that the turn out rate after the first two days of elections was a mere 2.27%. After the 
first round of the elections, the turn out rate was 16%, which then was raised to 26.6% 
by the officials. Volkel asserts that a significant number of voters decided to vote only 
after the authorities paid them. In addition, the state decided to give public employees a 
half-day off in order to encourage them to participate in elections. Among other reasons 
such as the election fatigue (Egyptians ratified two constitutions; elected one parliament 
and two presidents between 2011 and 2015), one can also argue that the confusing 
electoral system prepared by a committee, which is controlled by Al Sisi alienated a 
significant part of the Egyptian society. Volkel also suggests that the fact that organized 
party lists make up only around 20% of the legislature prevented a stronger 
mobilization of voters for programmatic reasons. Independent candidates in the 2015 
elections tried to appeal to the voters through their personality or promise of economic 
benefits instead of a political program that could target a genuine democratization. 
Hence, there were almost no public debates about Egypt’s important problems ahead of 
elections that could boost Egyptian people’s participation in elections. 
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5.5.2. Tunisia 
 
 
While Egyptian political elite’s choice of electoral systems alienated the voter; 
polarized the political spectrum; and obstructed transition to democracy, Tunisian 
political elite established an electoral system that paved the way for a smoother 
transition process.  
Boubakri (2015, pp. 141-142, 144) explains that Tunisia became one of the few 
Arab countries in 1956 to recognize full suffrage and granted the women right to vote 
and to stand as candidates in elections. The 1959 Tunisian constitution also recognized 
political rights including election rights, which if fulfilled would prove to be a historic 
opportunity to build a democratic system based on political inclusiveness. However, 
says Boubakri, political opposition was reduced to façade first by Bourguiba (1959-
1987) and then by Ben Ali (1987-2011). Bourguiba banned all political opposition 
between 1959 and 1981 while Ben Ali created political parties that would serve as loyal 
opposition his Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (CDR). During that period, the 
regime used a majoritarian system with a party block vote to win all seats in every 
constituency, as the CDR always got the majority of the vote. In addition, electoral 
fraud was common, and falsified results always secured more than 90% of seats for the 
ruling party. As a result, the opposition did not win a single seat between 1956 and 
1989. For example, in the first multi-candidate presidential elections in 2004, Ben Ali 
won with an overwhelming majority of more than 90% of the vote.  
According to Boubakri (2015), political exclusion during the Ben Ali era made 
demands for genuine inclusiveness and effective participation in public life one of the 
major targets of the Tunisian uprising. Accordingly, the interim government led by Beji 
Caid Essebbi (later leader of Call of Tunisia and president-elected since December 
2014) set up a new legal and institutional framework. The new law on elections was 
adopted on 10 May 2011 with Decree Law 2011-35, which had important implications 
for the 2014 Tunisian constitution and Law 2014-16 of 26 May 2014 on elections and 
referendums (Boubakri, 2015, pp. 143-144).  
Decree 2011-35 replaced the majoritarian system in place with a closed-list 
proportional representation system. Seats were allocated in regional districts using the 
largest remainder method. Therefore, unlike the Egyptian electoral law of 2011 and 
2014, the Tunisian election law avoids employing PR and majoritarian formulas 
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simultaneously. Instead, the lawmakers in Tunisia opted for a simple PR method that 
would reflect the choices of the electorate without confusing them and while preventing 
bigger parties to dominate the parliament. For instance, the Islamist Ennahda 
(Renaissance), which is an offshoot of the MB in Tunisia won 41% of the Tunisian 
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in the 2011 elections while the same percentage 
allowed FJP to control 45% of the legislature in Egypt; thus forcing the Ennahda to 
negotiate the terms of a coalition with two social democrat parties after the 2011 
elections; namely Congress for the Republic and Democratic Forum for Labor & 
Liberties, which got 8.7% and 7% of the votes respectively.  
Another major difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian electoral systems 
is the fact that the Tunisian electoral law excluded remnants of the old system while 
especially the 2015 Egyptian election law re-incorporated Mubarak-era figures into the 
system. Decree Law 2011-35 provided two kinds of exclusion to eliminate actors 
affiliated with Ben Ali. First, more than 100 people who were relatives of Ben Ali and 
people who had unduly gained assets due to their connection with the family were 
denied voting rights. Second, a larger number of people who were involved with the 
Ben Ali regime were made ineligible to be candidates in the 2011 elections (Boubakri, 
2015, p. 155). Last but not the least, Decree Law 2011-35 included clauses to enhance 
the representation of the economically marginalized regions of the country. 
Traditionally, the interior regions of Tunisia were economically, socially, and politically 
marginalized. For example, Mohammed Bouazizi, who self-immolated himself, hailed 
from Sidi Bouzid a relatively small city in a marginalized region. In addition, these 
impoverished regions were also subject to direct central government interference in 
nominating and selecting local officials. Therefore, integration of these regions into the 
decision-making processes formed a top priority for the lawmakers in the post-Ben Ali 
era. Article 33 of Decree Law 2011-35 took into the demands of the interior regions, 
and granted additional seats in order to enhance their representation in the NCA. As a 
result, some marginalized regions such as Tatouine and Tozeur doubled their 
representation in the assembly compared to the 2009 parliament (Boubakri, 2015).  
Carey (2013) says that his examination of the district-level data demonstrates 
that had Tunisia employed the other most commonly used electoral formulas, the largest 
party Ennahda would have been awarded a super-majority in the NCA and been in a 
position to impose a constitution without any assistance from other political parties. 
Carey et al. (2015) explain that if Tunisia’ 2011 NCA elections had been conducted 
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with using one of the so called “divisor” or “highest averages” methods, Ennahda would 
have earned seats ranging from 47% (under the divisor system) to 69% (under the 
D’Hondt divisor4). They assert that the choice of largest remainder system allowed 
Islamist Ennahda to capture only 41% of the seats forcing it to forge coalition with 
actors from the other end of the political spectrum. 
Carey et al. (2015, pp. 24-25) argue that another key difference between Egypt 
and Tunisia in terms of their electoral systems is that the Tunisian electoral system is 
the result of a bargain between Tunisian political parties and civil society while the 
2011 and 2014 Egyptian electoral systems were imposed by the mighty Egyptian army. 
The Egyptian military decided to preserve electoral institutions that operated during the 
Mubarak era. For instance, the individual candidacies system that was associated with 
patronage and personalities rather than policies and programs was kept intact both in the 
2011 and 2015 electoral systems. On the contrary, Tunisian political elite decided to 
overthrow the old electoral system, and opted for a PR system that would empower 
political parties in the post-Ben Ali Tunisia. This decision contributed to a balance of 
power between Islamists and seculars in the Tunisian NCA; hence fostering a political 
atmosphere in the country that necessitated dialogue, inclusiveness, and an eventual 
cooperation between these actors despite the presence of historical suspicions.  
After the 2011 NCA elections, the lslamist Ennahda agreed with two social 
democrat parties (Congress for the Republic and Democratic Forum for Labor & 
Liberties) to share top three positions in the country. Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda became 
the prime minister. Moncef Marzouki of Congress for the Republic became the 
president while Mustafa Ben Jaafar of Democratic Forum for Labor & Liberties became 
the new assembly's speaker (BBC, 2011). Major players of the Tunisian political theater 
continued to cooperate after the October 2014 parliamentary elections as well. In these 
elections the secular Call of Tunisia (Nida Tounes) garnered 37.6% of the votes to be 
followed by Ennahda with 27.8% of the votes. The third party was another secular party 
Free Patriotic Union with 4.1% of the votes. Contrary to the expectations of Wolf 
(2014), the victorious Nida Tounes chose to form a unity government that also includes 
a members from the rivaling Ennahda and other opposition parties (Al Jazeera, 2015). 
4According to Gallagher (1991), the D’Hondt system is likely to give larger parties a larger share of seats than their 
share of the electorate in the elections. The major goal of this method is to guarantee that a party with a majority of 
voters will get at least half of the seats in the legislature. 
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These coalitions were marriage of convenience. They were necessitated by the election 
system that allowed neither Ennahda nor Call of Tunisia a majority in the legislature. 
Unlike the Egyptian constitution of 2012, which was the work of a committee 
dominated by Islamists, the 2014 Tunisian constitution was the work of a coalition, 
which negotiated the terms.    
 
 
 93 
CHAPTER 6 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
 A major target of this research was to study the factors, which affect the ways in 
which ordinary people understand the term democracy. Benefiting from the 6th wave of 
World Values Survey that was conducted in 60 countries between 2010 and 2014, this 
research examined how the context people occupy affects the ways in which they 
understand democracy. In chapter 3, I used GDP per capita (PPP) as the independent 
variable measuring wealth. Analysis demonstrated that GDP per capita (PPP) is an 
important factor affecting the ways in which people define democracy. Compared to 
people in countries with lower GDP per capita (PPP), people are more likely to consider 
procedural characteristics essential to democracy in countries with higher GDP per 
capita (PPP). I argued that this finding might indicate people in economically more 
developed countries are more likely to provide their democracies with diffuse support 
for they value institutions and processes of democratic regime more than they value the 
economic goods the regime could provide. However, in economically less developed 
countries, people are less likely than people in economically more developed countries 
to consider procedural characteristics essential to democracy.  
Analysis also showed that when compared to people in economically less 
developed countries, people in countries in economically more developed countries are 
less likely to argue that economic characteristics are essential to democracy. Hence, one 
can argue that people in economically less developed countries could be more likely to 
provide the democratic regime with specific support whereas people in economically 
more developed countries lend diffuse support to their democratic regime.  
Chapter 3 also demonstrated that there is a negative relationship between GDP 
per capita (PPP) of a country and people’s support for authoritarianism in that country. 
That is in countries where GDP per capita is higher; people are found to be significantly 
less likely to support authoritarian regimes. If we evaluate these results in conjunction 
with the previous findings about procedural and economic characteristics of democracy, 
it is possible to claim that people in economically more developed countries express 
their preferences for procedural characteristics of democracy, and are more averse to 
authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, people in economically less developed 
 94 
countries expressing their preference for economic characteristics of democracy are also 
more likely to have authoritarian tendencies.  
I argued that this is because people in economically more developed countries 
provide their regime with diffuse support, and they are willing and able to support the 
democratic regime even when it fails to provide economic goods in the short term. 
Those who are more likely to prefer economic characteristics to procedural 
characteristics evaluate democracy’s performance with the economic benefits the 
regime is able to generate (specific support). Therefore, when the regime is unable to 
provide economic growth, employment, or other side benefits such as unemployment 
insurance, people might shift their loyalties and prefer an autocratic alternative to 
democracy if they believe an authoritarian regime would perform better in providing 
economic benefits.  
Thus, people’s support for democracy in countries with higher GDP per capita 
(PPP) makes it invulnerable to breakdowns while this is not the case in countries with 
lower GDP per capita (PPP).  In countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP), the regime 
has diffuse support that is directed toward institutions and unlikely to diminish with the 
regime’s economic performance in the short or medium run. Therefore, in economically 
more developed countries people are able to make a distinction between the regime in 
abstract and its performance and do not change their adherence to the regime when it 
fails to provide economic goods. In economically less developed countries, people 
provide the regime and its actors with specific support that causes democracies to 
remain unconsolidated, and might result with breakdown when an authoritarian option 
promises more economic goodies. Hence, this research finds support of the arguments 
by Lipset (1959) and Przeworski et al. (2000) who argue that a more well-to-do nation 
has greater chances to sustain its democracy. However, my findings do not show any 
evidence for the view that a country is more likely to become a democracy as its wealth 
increases. Instead, analysis provides evidence for the view that democracies are more 
likely to survive in countries with higher GDP per capita (PPP) since publics of these 
countries are more likely to lend diffuse support to the democratic regime.  
In chapter 4, I studied how the context interacts with individual attributes. My 
analyses in this chapter demonstrated that income and education (two key variables of 
modernization theory) do not have the same effect in economically less developed and 
economically more developed countries. The more educated people are more likely to 
support procedural characteristics of democracy in economically less developed 
 95 
countries while there is no difference in terms of the ways in which people consider 
procedural characteristics essential to democracy in economically more developed 
countries. In economically less developed countries only the more educated people are 
more likely to provide the democratic regime with diffuse support while in 
economically more developed countries people provide the regime with diffuse support 
regardless of their education levels.  
Chapter 4 also suggests that in economically less developed countries, high-
income people are less likely than low-income people to argue that procedural 
characteristics are essential to democracy. In economically more developed countries, 
compared to low-income people, high-income people are more supportive of procedural 
characteristics. Therefore, in economically less developed countries, low-income people 
are more likely than high-income people to have diffuse support whereas high-income 
people are more likely to have diffuse support to the democratic regime in economically 
more developed countries.  These findings demonstrate that Lipset’s research on the 
relationship between income and the tendency to hold pro-democratic values do not 
hold in economically less developed countries whereas his claim has more power 
economically more developed countries. Evidence shows that in countries where GDP 
per capita (PPP) is low, it is not the rich but poor who are more likely to define 
democracy in the language of procedures and institutions. In economically less 
developed countries, high-income people might be willing to extend support to 
authoritarian systems to protect their economic and political privileges in the face of 
threatening working class whereas the latter might be willing to support democratic 
institutions to acquire economic and political power that is captive in the hands of the 
rich. Therefore, one can conclude that the democratic elite in economically less 
developed countries needs the support of the poor most if democracy is ever to be 
consolidated in these cases. 
Analyses in chapter 4 also demonstrated that Lipset’s theses about the 
relationship between income and attitudes towards democracy as well as the 
relationship education and attitudes towards democracy need a significant revision. My 
analyses suggest that people in same education or income groups are likely to display 
important differences in their perceptions of democracy in economically more 
developed and in economically less developed countries. Therefore, one needs to 
account for the effect of the context on individual attributes when studying people’s 
attitudes towards democracy.     
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The findings in chapters 3 and 4 reveal the conditions under which a 
consolidation of the democratic regime is more likely. Przeworski et al. (2000) argue 
that economically more developed countries are more likely than poorer countries to 
consolidate their democracies. I argue that this is because the masses in economically 
more developed countries are more likely to present the democratic regime with diffuse 
support whereas the people in economically less developed countries provide the 
regime with specific support, which is episodic and based on a constant evaluation of 
the regime in terms of the economic benefits. If democracy fails to provide economic 
benefits in economically less developed countries, specific support to the regime 
evaporates thus paving the way for authoritarian options. 
These findings might also hint a direction for economically less developed 
countries, which experience difficulties in the consolidation of the democratic regime. 
At the beginning of this study, I defined democracy as follows: 
1. Pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of 
government power; 
2. Participation among equal citizens in the selection of parties and representatives 
through free, fair, and periodic elections; 
3. Civil and political liberties to speak, publish, assemble, and organize, as 
necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and participation; 
4. Welfare programs by the state that would alleviate the kind of poverty hindering 
people from exercising their rights as they are listed above. 
I furthermore argued that this definition of democracy is superior to procedural 
definitions of democracy for it includes procedural concerns along with a concern for 
outcomes. My research has shown that people in economically less developed countries 
are more likely than people in economically more developed countries to define 
democracy with economic references. People in economically more developed countries 
however are more likely than people in economically less developed countries to 
emphasize procedural characteristics of democracy. Then, consolidation of democracy 
in economically less developed countries is uncertain since citizens in these countries 
are more likely to provide the democratic regime with specific support to the regime as 
economic benefits seem to be more important than procedures and institutions of 
democracy for these people. It is in this context that I argue that those policies that 
promote procedural aspects of democracy while overlooking substantive dimensions do 
not provide a fertile ground for democracy in economically less developed countries. As 
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long as policy-makers in economically less developed countries do not develop welfare 
policies that will enable the citizens to enjoy their rights effectively, a breakdown of 
democracy will be more likely as citizens could shift their loyalties to an authoritarian 
option, which promises more economic goodies. In this respect, policies that promote 
welfare of the citizens in economically less developed countries will prolong the life of 
the democratic regime by guaranteeing the continuation of support to the regime in the 
short-run. This will give the democratic regime the breathing space to build the 
institutions of the democratic regime and socialize its citizens with a democratic culture, 
which in turn will flourish diffuse support. Therefore, presence of a concern among the 
ruling elite for the welfare of the citizens in young democracies could be an important 
factor preventing a breakdown of democracy in the short run and bringing about its 
consolidation in the longer run.  
 However, my analyses do not establish the conditions when transitions to 
democracy succeed or an incumbent takeover of democracy does not take place. To 
provide an answer to this question, Chapter 5 studied Egypt and Tunisia after 2011. In 
this chapter, I argued that two factors were instrumental: elite cohesion and the electoral 
system preference. In both Egypt and Tunisia, it was the military’s split from the regime 
during the uprisings that brought about the end of dictatorial regimes. I also suggested 
that electoral system preference in Egypt and Tunisia played a key role determining the 
course of transitions in both countries. The excessively complex Egyptian electoral 
systems did not foster a culture of cooperation between Islamists and seculars. These 
electoral systems also failed to include different actors in the process during the 
transitional phase. It was these deficiencies of the 2011 and 2014 electoral systems that 
contributed to further polarization of the political scene and the eventual collapse of 
democracy in Egypt. The Tunisian electoral system did not allow major actors to 
dominate the legislature. As a result, major political actors had to form coalitions and 
move forward with significant compromise between 2011 and 2014, which in turn 
democracy as the most preferred outcome for all major actors since none of the actors 
was strong enough to monopolize power in its own hands.  This fact also left its imprint 
on the 2014 Tunisian constitution making it a product of negotiation and consensus 
between different actors.    
Democracy as a political system has the potential to capture the imagination of 
everybody, educated and non-educated as well as rich and the poor. However, the term 
is essentially contested as Gallie (1956) defined it. Despite that quality of the concept, 
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scholarly community and the Western political elite promotes democracy as the ideal 
and the natural that should be adopted without questioning. However, democracy is a 
socially constructed term, and we have only little understanding about the ways in 
which ordinary people define democracy. Without more research that would enable us 
to study how people understand democracy and why they define it this way rather than 
that way, attempts to promote democracy in non-Western parts of the world may prove 
futile. In this context, this research was an attempt to identify some of the factors that 
affect the ways in which ordinary people understand the term. Understanding those 
factors will help us to advance democracy studies and aid the international community 
in its efforts to promote democracy as a political system.  
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Appendix A: List of countries included WVS 6th wave 
 
Table. List of countries included WVS 6th wave 
Country Country Country Country 
Algeria Georgia Morocco South Korea 
Argentina Germany Netherlands South Africa 
Armenia Ghana New Zealand Spain 
Australia Hong Kong Nigeria Sweden 
Azerbaijan India Pakistan Taiwan 
Bahrain Iraq Palestine Thailand 
Belarus Japan Peru Trinidad 
Brazil Jordan Philippines Tunisia 
Colombia Kazakhstan Poland Turkey 
Cyprus Kuwait Qatar Ukraine 
Chile Kyrgyzstan Romania United States 
China Lebanon Russia Uruguay 
Ecuador Libya Rwanda Uzbekistan 
Egypt Malaysia Singapore Yemen 
Estonia Mexico Slovenia Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B: GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country 
 
 
Table. GDP per capita (PPP) (2014), by country 
Country GDP per capita (PPP) Country GDP per capita (PPP) 
Algeria 
 
Morocco 7,491 
Argentina  22,400 Netherlands 47,663 
Armenia 8,070 New Zealand 36,391 
Australia 43,930 Nigeria 
 Azerbaijan 
 
Pakistan 4,811 
Bahrain 
 
Palestine 4,509 
Belarus 18,185 Peru 11,989 
Brazil 15,838 Philippines 6,969 
Colombia 13,357 Poland 24,745 
Cyprus 30,873 Qatar 
 Chile 22,346 Romania 19,401 
China 13,206 Russia 
 Ecuador 11,372 Rwanda 1,661 
Egypt 10,530 Singapore 82,763 
Estonia 26,946 Slovenia 29,963 
Georgia 7,582 South Korea 34,356 
Germany 45,802 South Africa 13,046 
Ghana 4,082 Spain 33,211 
Hong Kong 55,084 Sweden 45,183 
India 5,701 Taiwan  N.A. 
Iraq 
 
Thailand 15,735 
Japan 36,426 Trinidad 31,967 
Jordan 12,050 Tunisia 11,436 
Kazakhstan 
 
Turkey 19,200 
Kuwait 
 
Ukraine 8,666 
Kyrgyzstan 3,322 United States 54,630 
Lebanon 17,462 Uruguay 20,884 
Libya 
 
Uzbekistan 5,573 
Malaysia 25,639 Yemen 
 Mexico 17,108 Zimbabwe 1,792 
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Appendix C: EUI the democracy index scores, by country 
 
 
Table: EUI the democracy index scores, by country 
Country Score (2014) Country Score (2014) 
Algeria 3.83 Morocco 4.00 
Argentina 6.84 Netherlands 8.92 
Armenia 4.13 New Zealand 9.26 
Australia 9.01 Nigeria 3.76 
Azerbaijan 2.83 Pakistan 4.64 
Bahrain 2.87 Palestine 4.72 
Belarus 3.69 Peru 6.54 
Brazil 7.38 Philippines 6.77 
Colombia 6.55 Poland 7.47 
Cyprus 7.40 Qatar 3.18 
Chile 7.80 Romania 6.68 
China 3.00 Russia 3.39 
Ecuador 5.87 Rwanda 3.25 
Egypt 3.16 Singapore 6.03 
Estonia 7.74 Slovenia 7.57 
Georgia 5.82 South Korea 8.06 
Germany 8.64 South Africa 7.82 
Ghana 6.33 Spain 8.05 
Hong Kong 6.46 Sweden 9.73 
India 7.92 Taiwan 7.65 
Iraq 4.23 Thailand 5.39 
Japan 8.08 Trinidad 6.99 
Jordan 3.76 Tunisia 6.31 
Kazakhstan 3.17 Turkey 5.12 
Kuwait 3.78 Ukraine 5.42 
Kyrgyzstan 5.24 United States 8.11 
Lebanon 5.12 Uruguay 8.17 
Libya 3.80 Uzbekistan 2.45 
Malaysia 6.49 Yemen 2.79 
Mexico 6.68 Zimbabwe 2.78 
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Appendix D: Gini scores, by country 
 
 
Table. Gini scores, by country 
Country Gini Score Country Gini Score 
Algeria 0.647 Morocco 0.593 
Argentina 0.577 Netherlands 0.72 
Armenia 0.685 New Zealand N.A. 
Australia 0.651 Nigeria 0.57 
Azerbaijan 0.834 Pakistan 0.704 
Bahrain N.A. Palestine 0.655 
Belarus 0.74 Peru 0.553 
Brazil 0.471 Philippines 0.57 
Chile 0.495 Poland 0.676 
China 0.579 Qatar N.A. 
Colombia 0.465 Romania 0.727 
Cyprus 0.657 Russia 0.584 
Ecuador 0.527 Rwanda 0.487 
Egypt 0.692 Singapore N. A. 
Estonia 0.668 Slovenia 0.744 
Georgia 0.600 South Africa 0.366 
Germany 0.699 South Korea N.A. 
Ghana 0.572 Spain 0.641 
Hong Kong N.A. Sweden 0.727 
India 0.661 Taiwan N.A. 
Iraq 0.705 Thailand 0.607 
Japan 0.679 Trinidad N.A. 
Jordan 0.663 Tunisia 0.642 
Kazakhstan 0.736 Turkey 0.598 
Kuwait N.A. Ukraine 0.754 
Kyrgyzstan 0.726 United States 0.589 
Lebanon N.A. Uruguay 0.581 
Libya N.A. Uzbekistan 0.647 
Malaysia 0.537 Yemen. Rep. 0.641 
Mexico 0.519 Zimbabwe N.A. 
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 Appendix E: Share of Muslims (%), by country 
 
 
Table. Share of Muslims (%), by country 
Country Muslim (%) Country Muslim (%) 
Algeria 0,979 Morocco 0,99 
Argentina 0,01 Netherlands 0,06 
Armenia 0,001 New Zealand 0,012 
Australia 0,024 Nigeria 0,488 
Azerbaijan 0,969 Pakistan 0,964 
Bahrain 0,703 Palestine 0,976 
Belarus 0,001 Peru 0,001 
Brazil 0,001 Philippines 0,055 
Colombia 0,001 Poland 0,001 
Cyprus 0,253 Qatar 0,677 
Chile 0,001 Romania 0,001 
China 0,018 Russia 0,1 
Ecuador 0,001 Rwanda 0,018 
Egypt 0,949 Singapore 0,143 
Estonia 0,001 Slovenia 0,036 
Georgia 0,107 South Korea 0,001 
Germany 0,058 South Africa 0,017 
Ghana 0,158 Spain 0,021 
Hong Kong 0,018 Sweden 0,046 
India 0,144 Taiwan 0,001 
Iraq 0,99 Thailand 0,055 
Japan 0,001 Trinidad 0,059 
Jordan 0,972 Tunisia 0,99 
Kazakhstan 0,704 Turkey 0,98 
Kuwait 0,741 Ukraine 0,012 
Krygyzstan 0,88 United States 0,001 
Lebanon 0,613 Uruguay 0,001 
Libya 0,966 Uzbekistan 0,967 
Malaysia 0,637 Yemen 0,99 
Mexico 0,001 Zimbabwe 0,08 
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